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Abstract
We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in in-
stances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism
assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; then the
agents provide (stochastic) feedback to the mechanism for the allocation they
received. This is motivated by applications in cloud markets and online advertising
where an agent may know her value for an allocation only after experiencing it.
Therefore, the mechanism needs to explore different allocations for each agent,
while simultaneously attempting to find the socially optimal set of allocations. Our
focus is on truthful and individually rational mechanisms which imitate the classi-
cal VCG mechanism in the long run. To that end, we define three notions of regret
for the welfare, the individual utilities of each agent and that of the mechanism. We
show that these three terms are interdependent via an Ω(T 2/3) lower bound for the
maximum of these three terms after T rounds of allocations, and describe a family
of anytime algorithms which achieve this rate. Our framework provides flexibility
to control the pricing scheme so as to trade-off between the agent and seller regrets,
and additionally to control the degree of truthfulness and individual rationality.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design is one of the most important problems in economics and computer science [36].
A mechanism chooses allocations for multiple rational agents with possibly conflicting goals, where
it is necessary to find an outcome that is as beneficial as possible to all agents and the mechanism
designer. Agents who act in their own self interest might choose to misrepresent their values in order
to obtain an advantageous allocation. Mechanism design aims to elicit values from agents, such that
the agents are incentivised to report truthfully (truthfulness), while ensuring that they are not worse
off than if they had not participated in the mechanism (individual rationality).
As a motivating example, consider a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) provider who serves multiple
customers using the same compute cluster. The service provider (mechanism designer) chooses a
service level (allocation) for each customer (agent) and charges them accordingly. The service level
determines the resources allocated to the customer, and therefore determines her value for that service,
which could be tied to her own revenue. A customer’s experience of a service level at a given instant,
is affected by exogenous stochastic factors such as traffic, machine failures, etc. The celebrated
VCG mechanism [15, 23, 44], provides a means to find socially optimal outcomes in such situations
while satisfying truthfulness and individual rationality. For instance, if one customer’s application
is memory intensive and another’s is compute intensive, they can be co-located on the same set of
machines instead of using separate machines. This might be a better outcome for the service provider
as she can serve both customers at a cheaper cost, and for the customers, since the service provider
can now charge them less and they achieve the same end result.
A crucial shortcoming of most mechanism design work, which limits its usage in practice, is that
it assume agents know their own values for each allocation; for instance, the VCG mechanism
requires that customers submit bids representing these values. This may not be true in many real
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world situations, especially when there are many unsophisticated agents and/or when the number
of allocations is very large. However, having experienced an allocation, it is often the case that a
customer can provide feedback based on their experience. She can either measure this directly via the
impact on her own revenue, such as in online advertising where an ad impression might lead to a
click and then a purchase, or gauge it from performance metrics, such as in the PaaS example where
the service level affects the fraction of queries completed on time, which in turn affects her revenue.
In a departure from prior work, we study mechanisms where agent values can be learned—both by
the agents and the mechanism—over multiple rounds of allocations, while simultaneously finding
the socially optimal outcome. We assume that agents are rational, i.e. they wish to maximise their
utility, but may be unsophisticated, i.e. they may not know their values. This problem ushers in the
classical explore-exploit dilemma encountered in bandit settings. On any round, choosing the best
set of allocations according to feedback provided by agents thus far will likely have large welfare;
but exploring other allocations might improve the estimate of the best allocation for future rounds.
Considerations of truthfulness and individual rationality are more challenging in this setting. While
experiencing an outcome allows an agent to learn her values, the mechanism cannot learn them if she
does not report back truthfully; moreover, since she reports a value on each round, she has significantly
more opportunity to manipulate outcomes. Additionally, since an agent’s true values cannot be exactly
known, the mechanism runs the risk of overcharging them, which might cause her to withdraw from
the mechanism. We design a family of algorithms that account for these considerations. Applications
such as PaaS or online advertising, where there are repeated agent-mechanism interactions and where
values can be reported back in an automated way, are suitable for such methods.
Our contribution in this work is threefold. First, we formalise mechanism design with bandit feedback
for settings where agents may not know their values, but the mechanism is repeated for several rounds.
We define regret terms for the welfare, the mechanism designer, and the agents relative to the VCG
mechanism. Given the above described challenges in exactly achieving truthfulness and individual
rationality, we define asymptotic variants to make the problem tractable. Second, we establish a
hardness result via a Ω(T 2/3) lower bound after T rounds for the maximum of the three regret terms
even under truthful reporting from agents. Third, we describe a family of learning algorithms that are
truthful, individually rational, and achieve this lower bound up to polylog factors.
2 Problem Description
We begin with a brief review of mechanism design adapted to our setting. There are n agents
(customers) {1, . . . , n}, a mechanism (seller), and a set of possible outcomes Ω. The mechanism
chooses an outcome ω ∈ Ω and charges a price pi to each agent. For agent i, there exists a function
si : Ω→ S which maps outcomes to allocations relevant to the agent; i.e., different outcomes ω, ω′
might yield the same allocation to the agent, si(ω) = si(ω′). In this work, |S| < ∞. S is at most
as large as Ω, but could be much smaller in some applications. An agent’s value for an allocation
is given by her value function, vi : S → [0, 1], where vi(s) represents her value for the allocation
s. For an outcome ω ∈ Ω, we will overload notation and write vi(ω) = vi(si(ω)). When an agent
experiences an allocation, she realises a reward Xi drawn from a σ sub-Gaussian distribution with
mean vi(s). We let v0 : Ω→ R denote the value function of the mechanism designer. In the PaaS
example, v0(ω) may denote the cost for providing the service where the allocations are as specified
in ω. For an outcome ω and prices {pi}ni=1, the utility of agent i is ui = E[Xi]− pi = vi(ω)− pi.
The utility of the seller (which may represent profit) is u0 = v0(ω) +
∑n
i=1 pi. The welfare V (ω)
is the sum of the agent and seller values V (ω) =
∑n
i=1 vi(ω) + v0(ω), which is also the sum of all
utilities regardless of the prices {pi}ni=1.
The VCG Mechanism: Assume that the agents know their value functions vi and submit them
truthfully as bids to the seller. The VCG mechanism stipulates that we choose the outcome ω? which
maximises the welfare. We then charge agent i an amount pi?, which is the loss her presence causes
to the others. Precisely, denoting V 9i(ω) = v0(ω) +
∑
j 6=i vj(ω), we have
ω? = argmax
ω∈Ω
V (ω), pi? = max
ω∈Ω
V 9i(ω)− V 9i(ω?). (1)
In general, an agent may submit a bid bi : S → [0, 1] (not necessarily truthfully), and the mechanism
computes the outcomes and prices by replacing vi with bi above. The VCG mechanism satisfies the
following three fundamental desiderata in mechanism design [26]:
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1. Truthfulness: A mechanism is (dominant strategy) truthful if, regardless of the bids submitted
by other agents, the utility ui of agent i is maximised when when bidding bi = vi.
2. Individual rationality: A mechanism is individually rational if it does not charge an agent more
than her bid for an allocation. Thus, if she bids truthfully, her utility is nonnegative.
3. Efficiency: If all agents bid truthfully, a mechanism is efficient if it maximises welfare.
Henceforth, when we say that an agent is truthful, we mean that she reports her values truthfully,
whereas when we say that a mechanism is truthful, we mean that it incentivises truthful behaviour
from the agents. We mention that the expectations above are taken with respect to the rewards, i.e. the
exogenous stochasticity arising when agents experience their allocation. In applications of interest,
the agent does not have control over nor able to predict this stochasticity. Therefore, it is meaningful
for agents to submit bids based on their expected rewards, i.e. their value. Notably, this is different
from Bayesian games where agent values are drawn from a known prior and she may submit bids
based on this value. (A Bayesian formulation of this setting would assume priors over the values, i.e.
the expected rewards, themselves.) The following examples illustrate our motivations.
Example 1 (PaaS). In the PaaS example from Section 1, S are the service levels (allocations)
available to a customer. Ω = Sn are the possible outcomes. −v0(ω) is the cost for providing the
service as specified in ω. An agent’s reward Xi for a service level s could denote her instantaneous
revenue, which is affected by exogenous stochastic factors such as traffic, machine failures, etc., but
it concentrates around her expected revenue, i.e. her value, vi(s).
Example 2 (Online Advertising). A publisher (mechanism) has a set of advertising slots S and
must assign them to n advertisers (agents). Typically, |S|  n and there exists ∅ ∈ S indicating no
assignment. When a slot is assigned to an advertiser, her reward is her instantaneous revenue which
depends on the number of clicks during the allotted time slot, and consequently a random quantity.
Different agents could have different click-through rates for different slots which determines their
values vi. Ω is the set of possible ways in which the mechanism can assign slots to advertisers.
Mechanism Design with Bandit Feedback: We now describe the learning problem in situations
where agents may not know their values, but the mechanism is repeated for multiple rounds. On each
round t, the mechanism chooses an outcome ωt ∈ Ω and sets prices {pit}ni=1 for the agents. Then,
agent i realises her reward Xit which has expectation vi(ωt). The utility of agent i on round t is
uit = E˜t[Xit]− pit = vi(ωt)− pit, where E˜t is an expectation only with respect to the rewards at
round t. Similarly, the utility of the seller is u0t = v0(ωt) +
∑n
i=1 pit. Let UiT =
∑T
t=1 uit, and
U0T =
∑T
t=1 u0t be the sum of utilities of agent i and the mechanism respectively over T rounds.
An agent may participate in this mechanism in one of two ways: (i) By bids: Ahead of time, she
may submit bids bi : S → [0, 1] (not necessarily truthfully) which represent her valuations. (ii)
By rewards: Alternatively, she may report a realised reward Yit (not necessarily truthfully) after
experiencing the allocation on each round. An agent may prefer the latter option if she does not
know her value function vi. Our goal is to design an anytime algorithm which operates over a
sequence of rounds to learn agent values, and imitates the VCG mechanism over time. To that end,
we quantify the performance of an algorithm via the following regret terms, defined relative to the
VCG mechanism (1), after T rounds of interactions:
RT = TV (ω?)−
T∑
t=1
V (ωt), R0T = Tu0?−U0T , RiT = Tui?−UiT , RaT =
n∑
i=1
RiT . (2)
Here ω? is the optimal outcome, which we will assume is unique. Moreover, u0? = v0(ω?) +
∑
i pi?
and ui? = vi(ω?)− pi? are the utilities of the seller and agent i respectively in the VCG mechanism.
RT is the welfare regret over T rounds, R0T is the regret of the seller, RiT is the regret of agent i,
and RaT is the regret of all agents. In defining UiT , U0T and in (2), we have followed pseudo-regret
convention, which takes an expectation with respect to the rewards at the current round. We focus on
the VCG mechanism because it is one of the well-studied paradigms in multi-parameter mechanism
design and is therefore a natural starting point. This is similar in spirit to Devanur and Kakade [18]
who study a seller’s regret, and Weed et al. [45] who study an agent’s regret when the agent bids in a
repeated single item auction—in both cases, the regret is defined relative to the Vickrey auction.
In addition to obtaining sublinear bounds for the above regret terms, we would like to achieve the
desiderata we formulated for mechanism design. Here we define variants of those desiderata in order
to precisely delineate the extent to which they can be achieved in our setting.
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1. Truthfulness: Let UiT , UpiiT be the sum of utilities when being truthful and when following any
other (non-truthful) strategy pi. A mechanism is truthful, if, for all pi, T , UpiiT ≤ UiT a.s.. It is
asymptotically truthful if, for all pi, T , E[UpiiT − UiT ] ∈ o(T ).
2. Individual rationality: Assume that agent i is truthful. A mechanism is individually rational if,
for all t, uit ≥ 0 a.s.. It is asymptotically individually rational if limT→∞ 1T E[UiT ] ≥ 0.
3. Efficiency: A mechanism is asymptotically efficient if E[RT ] ∈ o(T ) when all agents are truthful.
In our truthfulness definition, a strategy pi is a bid that the agent submits beforehand if participating
by bids. If she is participating by rewards, pi is a map from her past information and current allocation,
price, and reward to a possibly random scalar to report as Yit. To undestand the difference between
our almost-sure and in-expectation definitions, recall that uit = vi(ωt)− pit contains an expectation
with respect to the reward at round t, but is a random quantity as the allocation and prices depend on
the rewards realised/reported by all agents in previous rounds. In our almost sure definitions above,
the statements should hold regardless of this randomness, whereas in our in-expectation definitions,
they need to hold in expectation over the past exogenous randomness.
While achieving dominant strategy truthfulness is a desirable goal, it can be difficult, especially
in multi-round mechanisms [6, 7]. A common approach to sidestep this difficulty is to adopt a
Bayesian formalism which assumes that agent values are drawn from known prior beliefs; however,
this assumption can be strong [40]. In contrast, we do not make such distributional assumptions,
but rely on asymptotic notions of truthfulness to make the problem tractable. If a mechanism is
asymptotically truthful, the maximum value an agent may gain by not being truthful vanishes over
time. In many applications it is reasonable to assume that agents would be truthful if the benefit
of deviating is negligible, especially in settings where they may not know their value. It is worth
pointing out that prior work has explored similar ideas of approximate incentive-compatibility in
various contexts [17, 20, 27, 30, 35, 38]. We comment on this further in Appendix A.
For what follows, we define two problem-dependent terms. First, let K be the minimum number of
rounds necessary to assign all outcomes to all agents. In Example 1, K = |S|, assuming there are
no constraints on how different service levels can be assigned. In Example 2, K = n. Second, let
Vmax be an upper bound on the expected welfare. Since vi(s) ∈ [0, 1], Vmax could be as large as O(n).
However, it can be small in settings such as Example 2 where it is O(1) if there is only one ad slot.
3 Algorithm
Algorithm 1: VCG-Learn
Require: ζ ∈ {ETC, OPT}, f, g ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂}.
1: t← 0.
2: for q = 1, 2, . . . , do # brackets
3: Explore phase: Assign all allocations
s ∈ S to all agents at least once over K
rounds and charge them price 0. Collect
one realised reward per allocation from
each agent participating by rewards.
4: t← t+K.
5: for r = 1, . . . , b 56Kq1/2c, do
6: t← t+ 1.
7: ωt ← argmaxω V̂t(ω).
8: ∀ i, pit ← maxω F 9it (ω)−G9it (ωt).
9: Allocate ωt and charge {pit}i.
10: Collect rewards {Yit}i.
11: end for
12: end for
We now describe a family of algorithms for this
setting, called VCG-Learn, which follow the frame-
work outlined in Algorithm 1, on the right. The al-
gorithm has three discrete hyperparameters ζ, f, g.
These hyperparameters, which we will explain
shortly, control the trade-offs between the agent
and seller regrets and the properties discussed
above. The algorithm proceeds over a sequence of
brackets, with the number of rounds per bracket in-
creasing over time. Brackets are indexed by q and
rounds by t. Each bracket begins with an explore-
phase of K rounds where the mechanism assigns
all allocations in S to all agents once. It does not
charge the agents during this phase but collects
their realised rewards. This is then followed by
b 56Kq1/2c rounds, during which the mechanism
sets the outcome and prices based on the rewards
collected thus far.
To describe the outcome, we first define the follow-
ing three quantities, vit, v̂it,
̂
vit : S → [0, 1]. For an agent participating by rewards, vit(s) is the
sample mean of the rewards when agent i was assigned outcome s ∈ S , which serves as an estimate
for vi(s). Next, v̂it(s) and
̂
vit(s) are upper and lower confidence bounds respectively for vi(s). They
are computed as shown in (3). These expressions depend on the hyperparameter ζ; when ζ = ETC,
we only use rewards from the explore phase, whereas when ζ = OPT, we use rewards from all rounds
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thus far. Accordingly, let Dt denote the round indices belonging to explore phases up to round t− 1
when ζ = ETC and Dt = {1, . . . , t− 1} when ζ = OPT. Nit(s) denote the number of observations
from agent i for outcome s in the first t− 1 rounds that are used in the computation for vit, v̂it,
̂
vit.
These quantities are first computed when t > K and Nit(s) ≥ 1 so they are well defined.
Nit(s) =
∑
`∈Dt
1
(
si(ω`) = s
)
, vit(s) = clip
(
1
Nit(s)
∑
`∈Dt
Xi` 1
(
si(ω`) = s), 0, 1
)
,
B = σ
√
5 log(t− qK) + 2 log(|S|)
Nit(s)
, v̂it(s) = vit(s) +B, v̂it(s) = vit(s)−B. (3)
Since vi(s) ∈ [0, 1], we clip the initial estimate between 0 and 1 to obtain vit. We will assume
that each agent experiences each allocation in S exactly once during the exploration phase at the
beginning of each bracket. If an agent was assigned the same allocation multiple times, we will use
the reported value of only one of them, picked arbitrarily. For an agent i who participates by bidding
bi, we simply set vit(s) = v̂it(s) =
̂
vit(s) = bi(s). We now define V̂t, an upper confidence bound on
the welfare at time t. In line 7, the algorithm chooses the allocation which maximises V̂t in round t:
V̂t(ω) = v0(ω) +
∑n
i=1
v̂it(ω). (4)
Finally, the hyperparameters f, g ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂} determine the values assumed by functions fit, git :
S → [0, 1] and F 9it , G9it : Ω→ R, for all i, t, which are used in line 8 for the price calculations. If
f = v̂, set fit = v̂it, if f = v, set fit = vit, and if f =
̂
v, set fit =
̂
vit. Then define, F 9it (ω) =
v0(ω) +
∑
j 6=i fjt(sj(ω)). The functions git, G
9i
t are defined similarly based on hyperparameter g.
This completes the description of the algorithm. To warm us up for the theoretical analysis in the
next section, we discuss the implications of the hyperparameter choices ζ, f, g. First, when ζ = ETC,
Algorithm 1 behaves similar to explore-then-commit-style bandit algorithms [37]. It first explores
all options at the beginning of each bracket. It then switches to an exploit phase for the remainder
of the bracket during which it commits to the best outcome found during previous explore phases.
The main advantage of this two-phase strategy is a clean separation between preference learning
and outcome/pricing selection which gives rise to strong truthfulness guarantees. When ζ = OPT,
the procedure is reminiscent of optimistic strategies [29] which maximise an upper confidence
bound using rewards from all rounds. Not only is this sample-efficient as it uses rewards from all
rounds, but it also enjoys some better theoretical properties over ζ = ETC as we demonstrate shortly.
Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of weaker guarantees on truthfulness. While optimistic strategies
do not usually require an exploit phase, this is necessary in our problem to accurately estimate the
prices and ensure asymptotic truthfulness. Consequently, our regret bounds are worse than the typical√
T rates one comes to expect of optimistic strategies.
Next, the f, g hyperparameters are used for the fit, git functions, which are in turn used in the pricing
calculation of the algorithm. As a result, they determine the trade-offs between the agent regrets
RiT and the seller regret R0T . For instance, suppose we choose (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v). In line (8), for
F 9it , this uses the most optimistic estimate of the maximum welfare omitting agent i, and for G
9i
t ,
it uses the most pessimistic estimate of the values of the current outcomes for the other agents.
This results in large payments and consequently is the most favourable pricing scheme to the seller
(while still ensuring truthfulness, individual rationality, and sublinear agent regret). Similarly, when
(f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂), the pricing is favourable to the agents. We will illustrate these trade-offs, along
with their effects on individual rationality and truthfulness, in the next section. These options give a
practitioner a fair amount of flexibility when applying Algorithm 1 for their specific use case.
4 Analysis
This section present our main theoretical results. We first establish a lower bound on the maximum
of the three regret terms in (2), even when all agents are truthful. For instance, regardless of the
allocation, a seller can achieve small regret by demanding large payments; but this results in large
agent regret. To formalise this, let Θ be the class of problems with n agents, and A be the class of
algorithms for this setting. Note that the regret terms depend on the specific problem and algorithm.
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Theorem 1. Let all agents be truthful. For T ≥ 128n,
inf
A
sup
Θ
E
[
max
(
nRT , R
a
T , R0T )
] ≥ 1
50
(n− 1)4/3T 2/3.
Proof Sketch: Minimising all regret terms requires that we estimate the VCG prices (1) correctly,
which is the main bottleneck as the best outcome omitting an agent might be very different from the
optimal allocation. We first lower bound the left-hand side of Theorem 1 by nERT +EWT whereWT
captures how well we have estimated the prices. These two terms are conflicting—minimising one
will cause the other to be large. We reduce the task of minimising this quantity to binary hypothesis
testing and apply lower-bounding techniques for hypothesis testing to obtain the result.
We now present our theoretical results for Algorithm 1. Theorem 2 analyses ζ = ETC, and Theorem 3
analyses ζ = OPT. For both ζ values, there are nine different choices for (f, g). Instead of presenting
bounds for each case, we will focus on the most interesting instances. To convey the main intuitions,
we also suppress constant and polylog factors; complete expressions are in Appendices E and F.
When we write a . b or a & −b, we mean a ∈ O˜(b) or −a ∈ O˜(b) respectively.
Theorem 2. Let ζ = ETC. The following statements are true for Algorithm 1 after T > 2K rounds.
1. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g), the welfare regret satisfies E[RT ] . nK1/3T 2/3.
2. If all agents are truthful, the regrets of agent i and the seller satisfy the following. If (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂),
E[RiT ] . K1/3T 2/3, and E[R0T ] . n2K1/3T 2/3. If (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v), E[RiT ] . nK1/3T 2/3, and
E[R0T ] . VmaxK1/3T 2/3. If (f, g) = (v, v), E[RiT ] . nK1/3T 2/3, and E[R0T ] . n2K1/3T 2/3.
3. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g), E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )] . n2K
1/3T 2/3.
4. When (f, g) ∈ {(
̂
v, v̂), (v, v)}, Algorithm 1 is individually rational for an agent participating
by bids and asymptotically individually rational for an agent participating by rewards with
E[UiT ] & −K1/3T 2/3. When (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v), it is asymptotically individually rational for all
agents with E[UiT ] & −nK1/3T 2/3.
5. When ζ = ETC, Algorithm 1 is truthful for an agent participating by bids. Let UiT , UpiiT be the
sum of utilities when an agent participates by rewards truthfully and when she follows any other
(non-truthful) policy pi. Then, E[UpiiT − UiT ] . K1/3T 2/3, i.e. it is asymptotically truthful.
While all regret quantities scale at rate T 2/3, the dependence on other problem parameters are
determined by the choices for f, g. If we choose (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v), which, as we explained before, is
favourable to the seller, the seller’s regret scales at rate VmaxK
1/3T 2/3, with at most linear dependence
on n (recall Vmax ∈ O(n), but could be much smaller). However, this is disadvantageous for an
agent—her regret and asymptotic individual rationality bounds scale linearly with n. On the other
hand, if we choose (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂), then the agent regret is the smallest, but the seller suffers some
disadvantageous consequences. Since
̂
vjt ≤ v̂jt, in line 8 of Algorithm 1, pit could be negative,
i.e., the seller makes a payment to the customer. This violates the no-positive-transfers property
which is considered desirable in mechanism design. The seller’s regret is also poor, with n2 scaling.
Choosing (f, g) = (v, v) provides asymptotic individual rationality without n dependence for an
agent and satisfies no-positive-transfers for the seller, but the regrets of both the agent and the seller
are nK1/3T 2/3 and n2K1/3T 2/3 respectively, only improving from their worst case by constant factors.
Unfortunately, there is not much opportunity to improve these rates as long as we only use data
from the exploration phase. On the upside, we have strong guarantees on truthfulness; regardless
of the behaviour of the others, the mechanism is truthful for an agent participating by bids and
asymptotically truthful for an agent participating by rewards.
Now, let us turn to ζ = OPT. For our truthfulness guarantees, we will distinguish between two types
of strategies employed by any other agent j 6= i. A policy by agent j is said to be stationary if
she either submits bids at the beginning, or when assigned an outcome s ∈ S, she reports a sample
from some fixed distribution dependent on s. Any other policy is non-stationary. Intuitively, for an
agent participating by rewards, if we view the rewards reported for any allocation s ∈ S as a time
series, the policy is stationary if this time series is stationary. While truthfulness implies stationarity,
a non-truthful player can be either stationary or not. For example, when participating by rewards, an
agent may choose to report Yit = φs(Xit) when assigned an outcome s; the functions {φs}s ∈ S
may be designed to squash/amplify rewards for certain allocations, say, so as to manipulate future
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allocations. An agent is also stationarily non-truthful if she submits false bids. As we show below,
when ζ = OPT, Algorithm 1 is strategy-proof against stationary agents. To state our theorem, we also
define v†i = max
(
vi(ω?) − pi? −mins vi(s), 0
)
. If the agent prefers any outcome s ∈ S for free
compared to the VCG allocation and price (1), then v†i = 0.
Theorem 3. Let ζ = OPT. The following are true for Algorithm 1 after T > 2K rounds. The first
three statements assume that all agents are truthful.
1. For all (f, g), the welfare regret satisfies, E[RT ] . VmaxK1/3T 2/3 + n|S|1/2T 1/2.
2. The regrets of agent i and the seller satisfy the following.
If (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂), E[RiT ] . |S|1/2T 1/2+v†iK1/3T 2/3, E[R0T ] . n2|S|1/2T 1/2+n2K1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (
̂
v,
̂
v), E[RiT ] . n|S|1/2T 1/2 + v†iK1/3T 2/3, E[R0T ] . n2K1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v̂, v̂), E[RiT ] . |S|1/2T 1/2+nK1/3T 2/3, E[R0T ] . n2|S|1/2T 1/2+VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v), E[RiT ] . n|S|1/2T 1/2 + nK1/3T 2/3, E[R0T ] . VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
3. For all (f, g), we have E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )] . n2|S|1/2T 1/2 + n2K1/3T 2/3.
4. When g = v̂, Algorithm 1 is individually rational for an agent participating by bids, and asymp-
totically individually rational for an agent participating by rewards with E[UiT ] & −|S|1/2T 1/2.
When g =
̂
v, then it is asymptotically individually rational, with E[UiT ] & −n|S|1/2T 1/2.
5. Let UpiiT , UiT be as defined in Theorem 2. Assume that all other agents adopt stationary policies.
Then, for any (stationary or non-stationary) policy pi for agent i, E[UpiiT − UiT ] . nK1/3T 2/3.
This implies asymptotic Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility.
The truthfulness guarantee is weak when compared to Theorem 2 in two regards. Not only does the
asymptotic bound scale with n, but it also holds only when the other agents are adopting stationary
policies. However, since truthfulness implies stationarity, it does imply an asymptotic Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. That is, if all other agents are truthful, then an agent does not stand to gain significantly
by misreporting her rewards. In practice, it is wasteful to use only a small fraction of the data
for decision making, especially if we do not expect agents to be very strategic. The ζ = OPT
option is primarily motivated by this practical consideration. It allows us to efficiently learn in such
environments, while providing some weak protection against agents who might try to manipulate the
mechanism with “simple” methods, such as squashing/amplifying their rewards for certain outcomes.
We corroborate this intuition with a simple experiment in Appendix G where OPT outperforms ETC.
In addition to these empirical advantages, we also obtain quantitatively better theoretical advantages
in many use cases. We highlight the most important of them. First, in instances where Vmax does
not scale linearly with n, the welfare regret is smaller than in Theorem 2. Second, we have better
agent-seller trade-offs than before. For instance, when choosing (f, g) = (v̂, v̂), the seller’s regret
does not have an n2 dependence in the leading T 2/3 term. While the agent’s regret still scales poorly
as nK1/3T 2/3 for this choice, the rate for asymptotic individual rationality is only |S|1/2T 1/2 (as
opposed to nK1/3T 2/3 when (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v) in Theorem 2). When choosing (f, g) = (
̂
v,
̂
v), the
agent’s regret does not have an n dependence in the leading T 2/3 term. While the seller’s regret scales
poorly as n2K1/3T 2/3 for this choice, it satisfies no-positive-transfers. It is also worth mentioning
that when (f, g) ∈ {(
̂
v, v̂), (
̂
v,
̂
v)}, for agents for whom v†i = 0, we achieve
√
T regret. These
better rates are a direct consequence of optimistically choosing the allocation outside the exploration
phase; other choices for (f, g) do not yield such properties when ζ = ETC. We also note that when
(f, g) ∈ {(
̂
v, v̂), (v̂,
̂
v)}, the bounds are similar to the same choices for (f, g) in Theorem 2.
Finally, we mention that part 3 of both Theorems 2 and 3 establishes that E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )]
is n2K1/3T 2/3 for both algorithms. While this differs by a poly(n) factor from the lower bound in
Theorem 1, it achieves the T 2/3 rate.
Proof Sketch for Truthfulness: We write the instantaneous difference upiit − uit between the utility
of an agent when following strategy pi and when being truthful as (upiit− u˜it) + (u˜it− uit). Here, u˜it
is the utility when the agent follows pi up to time step t− 1 and then switches to truth telling. This is
formalised in Lemma 6. To bound the former, we use ideas from the proof of truthfulness of VCG.
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However, the latter term can be large, since, while the agent is being truthful at the current round, its
actions in previous rounds will have affected the allocations and prices chosen by the mechanism and
experienced by other agents. For this, we use properties of our algorithm to show that the agent’s past
actions cannot have changed the outcomes by too much.
5 Related Work & Discussion
In recent years, mechanism design has garnered much attention due to the rise in popularity of
sponsored search markets [1, 28, 33]. It also finds applications in cloud spot markets and wireless
spectrum auctions [16, 42]. Bandit problems were first studied by Thompson [41] and have since
become an attractive framework to study exploration-exploitation trade-offs that arise in online
decision-making. Optimistic methods for bandits are known to be minimax optimal in a variety
of stochastic optimisation settings [5, 13, 29]. While explore-then-commit strategies are provably
suboptimal [21], they separate exploration from exploitation facilitating a cleaner analysis when we
need to combine optimisation with other side objectives, such as in our problem, where we need to
ensure truthfulness and compute the prices.
There is a long history of work in the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design. Some
examples include online learning formulations [2, 19, 24], learning bidder valuations from past
observations [9, 10, 12], and learning in other settings with truthfulness constraints [32]. A relevant
line of work using bandit methods for mechanism design is that by Babaioff et al. [6, 7, 8], who study
a family of single and multi-parameter mechanism design problems, with a canonical use case in
online advertising. For simplicity, we explain the single-parameter version, where there is a single ad
slot with different and unknown click-through rates for each agent ci ∈ R. The agent has a known
private value vi ∈ R for each click and she submits a bid bi ∈ R ahead of time representing this
value. On each round, the mechanism chooses one of the agents for the slot who realises a stochastic
value c · vi where E[c] = ci. c is observed by both the agent and the mechanism. In a fixed-horizon
version of this problem, they derive an almost sure truthful mechanism with T 2/3 welfare regret and a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism with
√
T regret. There are a number of differences between their
work and ours. First, since the agent can only submit a single bid and the stochasticity is observed by
the mechanism, there is significantly less opportunity for an untruthful agent to manipulate outcomes.
Second, their assumption about realised rewards is less general than ours—even in online advertising,
it may be unrealistic to assume that an agent’s value is proportional to the number of clicks. Third,
they do not characterise the regret of the agents and the seller for the proposed mechanism. Due to
these differences, their results are not comparable to ours, and in particular, their
√
T regret does not
contradict our lower bound in Theorem 1. Devanur and Kakade [18] study a single-parameter auction
similar to the above online advertising problem, but focusing only on the seller regret, and Gatti et al.
[22] study a variant of this setting when there are multiple ad slots with different click-through rates.
We wish to emphasise that the main feature distinguishing our setting is that agents do not know their
values. In that vein, the closest work to ours is Nazerzadeh et al. [35], who study a single item auction
with a feedback method similar to ours. While they consider asymptotic efficiency, truthfulness, and
individual rationality (with definitions that differ from ours), they do not provide rates, establish
lower bounds, or study the regrets of the agents and seller. On a different note, Weed et al. [45] study
methods where an agent learns to bid in a repeated single-item Vickrey auction when she does not
know her value for the item. In contrast, in our setting, learning happens on the mechanism side,
imposing minimal burden on agents who may not be very strategic. Liu et al. [31] develop bandit
methods for agents on one side of a matching market to learn their preferences for arms on the other
side. A line of work on dynamic auctions [4, 11, 25] studies repeated auctions where agent values are
unknown at the beginning but there is a known prior on the agent value. Over time, she receives side
information and the mechanism needs to incentivise truth telling so as to update the posterior.
Summary: We studied mechanism design in settings where agents may not know their values, but
can experience an allocation and provide feedback in the form of a reward signal. We established
a lower bound for this problem, and presented a family of algorithms that achieve this rate. Our
framework allows one to control trade-offs between various properties of interest, such as agent and
seller regrets, individual rationality, truthfulness, and no-positive-transfers. Due to space constraints,
we have discussed some additional considerations and avenues for future work in Appendix A.
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Appendix
A Additional Discussion
Unknown Seller Values: We note that our algorithm and analysis assumes that seller values are
known. If this is unknown, one can define lower and upper confidence bounds for the seller similar
to (3) and use them in Algorithm 1 in place of v0, similar to those of the agents. While T
2/3 rates are
still possible, there are additional considerations. First, in many applications, it may not be reasonable
to assume that this distribution has the same sub-Gaussian constant σ (e.g. PaaS); the variance of the
seller might scale with n and this will invariably be reflected in the regret bounds, including that of
the agents. Second, since Ω may be much larger than S, this results in long exploration phases and
worse regret bounds reflected via the parameter K.
Approximately optimal mechanisms: We have assumed that we can maximise the upper confidence
bound (4) exactly. In many settings, this might be computationally prohibitive, and we might only
be able to obtain an approximate solution. It will be instructive to study which of the desiderata
carry through in this case. If we have an α-approximate solver (α < 1), it is straightforward
to show that sublinear welfare regret (2) is possible under truthful reporting, if it is defined as
RT = αTV (ω?)−
∑
t V (ωt). However, bounding the agent and seller regrets requires more careful
analysis as their utility depends on the allocation chosen by the solver. Implications on truthfulness
are even less clear, especially as an agent can be strategic over multiple rounds.
On Asymptotic Truthfulness: We highlight some of the challenges in achieving non-asymptotic
truthfulness in our setting. For this purpose, consider a two agent single item setting, where, when
the item is allocated to an agent, the reward is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution. The value of
each agent when receiving the item is therefore the mean of this distribution and 0 otherwise. The
first agent participates by submitting a bid of 1/2 ahead of time, and this bid is known to the second
agent. In this example, if the second agent’s value p is more than 1/2, it is always a better strategy
to report Yit = 1 on all rounds, even when she realises 0; this way, the item gets assigned to her
more often than if she had reported truthfully, and on each case, her expected utility is p− 1/2 > 0
(since the first agent participates by bids, both our mechanisms would charge 1/2 as in a Vickrey
auction.). However, it is not hard to see that always submitting Yit = 1 is a bad strategy for the
agent if p < 1/2. For an agent to be able to manipulate outcomes in this manner, she needs to know
her value, which we assume is not the case in our set up. This example illustrates the challenges in
achieving non-asymptotic truthfulness in our setting, when agents do not know their values, while
simultaneously achieving efficiency. We believe that this difficulty is fundamental, and leave it to
future work to characterise these limitations.
On the same note, it is worth asking that if an agent who knows her values, can choose to participate
by rewards and manipulate outcomes this way. Both our theorems answers this in the negative; the
guarantees for an agent participating by bids are quantitatively better and hold almost surely. (See
Appendices E and F for full theorem statements). For instance, in the above example, if the agent
submits p > 1/2 as a bid, she will receive the item on all non-explore rounds.
Implications of Truthfulness Constraints on Learning: The lower bound in Theorem 1 only
captures one of the two key difficulties in this problem, namely pricing calculation for agent/seller
trade-offs; the other being truthfulness. It is worth studying the implications of even asymptotic
truthfulness on learning. In some applications, it is not necessary to minimise all three regret terms;
for instance, the PaaS setting in Example 1 could occur within an organisation, where the service
provider is one team providing a service to other (agent) teams. In such cases, the seller regret is
not a meaningful quantity. In this setting, it is possible to obtain
√
T regret for both the welfare and
the agents if the agents report truthfully: at all time steps, select the allocation which maximises
the upper confidence bound on the welfare and choose a favourable pricing scheme to the agents,
such as (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂). However, this is not a truthful mechanism. In situations like this, we
believe that truthfulness will prevent obtaining
√
T regret. For instance, Babaioff et al. [6] and
Devanur and Kakade [18] show that T 2/3 regret is unavoidable for deterministic truthful algorithms
in their online advertising problem. Their proof relies heavily on a necessary and sufficient condition
for truthfulness in single-parameter auctions where agents submit bids [3, 34]. Extensions of this
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condition to multi-parameter auctions exist [39]. However, this characterisation does not apply in our
problem where the agent does not know her value and reports a reward over multiple rounds.
B Preliminaries
We begin with some notation, definition, and results that will be useful throughout our analysis.
E,P will denote expectations and probabilities. Et,Pt will denote expectation and probability
when conditioned on observations up to time t − 1; for example, Pt(·) = P(·|Dt), where Dt =
{si`, Yi`}i≤n,`≤t−1.
Recall that ω? = argmaxω V (ω) is the socially optimal outcome. Let si? = si(ω?) be the allocation
for agent i at the optimum. Similarly, V 9i and ω9i? , defined below, will denote the welfare without
agent i and its optimiser respectively.
V 9i(ω) = v0(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
vi(ωt), ω
9i
? = argmax
ω∈Ω
V 9i(ω). (5)
Our first result is a straightforward fact regarding agent and seller utilities in the VCG mechanism.
Fact 4. When allocations and prices are chosen according to the VCG mechanism,
ui? = vi(si?)− pi? = V (ω?)− V 9i(ω9i? ),
u0? = v0(ω?) +
n∑
i=1
pi? =
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ω9i? )− (n− 1)V (ω?).
Our second result expresses the regret terms in a way that is convenient for analysis. Define:
HT =
1
T
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
pit + V
9i(ωt)
)
, WT = HT −
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ω9i? ). (6)
Since HT is computed using observations from rounds 1 to T , it can be thought of as the algorithm’s
estimate of
∑
i V
9i(ω?) at the end of T rounds. The following lemma expresses RaT and R0T in
terms of RT and WT .
Lemma 5. Let RaT , R0T , RT be as defined in (2). Then,
RaT = nRT + TWT , R0T = −(n− 1)RT − TWT .
Proof. Let hit = pit + V 9i(ωt) so that HT = 1T
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 hit. For agent i, we can use Fact 4 and
the fact that uit = vi(ωt)− pit = V (ωt)− hit to obtain,
ui? − uit = (V (ω?)− V (ω9i? ))− (V (ωt)− hit) = (V (ω?)− V (ωt)) + (hit − V (ω9i? )).
Then, since RaT =
∑
i
∑
t(ui? − uit), we have
RaT =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
(
(V (ω?)− V (ωt)) + (hit − V (ω9i? ))
)
= n
T∑
t=1
(V (ω?)− V (ωt)) + T
(
HT −
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ω9i? )
)
.
This proves the first claim. For the seller, at time t, we observe
u0t = v0(ωt) +
n∑
i=1
pit = v0(ωt) +
n∑
i=1
hit −
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ωt) =
n∑
i=1
hit − (n− 1)V (ωt).
As before, we can now use Fact 4 to write,
R0T =
T∑
t=1
(u0? − u0t) =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
(
V 9i(ω9i? )− hit
)
+ (n− 1)
T∑
t=1
(V (ωt)− V (ω?)).
The claim follows by observing that the first term in the RHS is −TWT and that the second term is
−RT .
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Our next result helps us quantify the difference when an agent submits her realised rewards truthfully
vs when she does not. To state this lemma, consider a general setting where an agent interacts with a
stateful environment over T rounds. That is, on each round t, she takes some action at, collects an
observation yt, and receives a reward zt (possibly unobserved). The actions taken by this agent can
affect the state of the environment, and, in turn, the observations and rewards depend on this state.
The agent may use the observations to inform decisions in future rounds. Generally speaking, the
agent is following a policy pi to make her decisions, which maps past actions and observations to an
action for the current time step. Let zpit be the reward at time t when following such a policy pi from
round 1. Let ZpiT =
∑T
t=1 z
pi
t denote the sum of rewards. The following lemma will help us quantify
the difference between two policies.
Lemma 6. Let pi1, pi2 be two different policies in the above set up and Zpi1T , Z
pi2
T be the sum of
rewards. Let pirt denote the policy which follows pi2 for rounds 1, . . . , r and then follows pi1 for rounds
r + 1, . . . , T . Let zrt denote the reward at time t when following policy pi
r
t . Then,
Zpi2T − Zpi1T =
T∑
t=1
(zpi2t − zt−1t ) +
T∑
t=2
(zt−1t − zpi1t ). (7)
Proof. The claim follows by adding and subtracting
∑T
t=1 z
t−1
t , rearranging the terms, and noting
that z01 = z
pi1
1 .
To see how we will use Lemma 6 in our truthfulness proofs, let pi1 denote the truthful submission of
bids or rewards and let pi2 be any other (non-truthful) policy. Then pirt is the policy which follows pi2
for rounds 1, . . . , r and then switches to truthful submission for the remaining rounds. The terms
inside the first summation in (7) denotes the instantaneous difference in being truthful, which can be
controlled using proof techniques similar to that of truthfulness in the VCG mechanism. However, an
agent may choose to be strategic over multiple rounds, say by achieving only small rewards in early
rounds, with the intent of gaining in the long term. This is reflected in the second summation, and we
will use properties of our algorithm, along with the fact that the agent is currently being truthful, to
control this term.
Remark 1. When the observations yt are stochastic and/or there is randomness in the policies
pi1, pi2, Lemma 6 holds in an almost sure sense. To see this, say that observations for all time steps,
actions and states of the environment are generated according to some source of randomness ηo. The
agent only sees observations according to the current state and its current action. Second, policy pii
may choose its action as a function of past observations and some external source of randomness ηi.
Then, (7) holds when you fix ηo, η1, and η2.
Finally, we will repeatedly use the following two results in our proofs.
Lemma 7. Let f1, f2 : X → R for some finite set X such that f1(x)− f2(x) ≤  for all x ∈ X and
a given  ≥ 0. Then max f1 −max f2 ≤ .
Proof. Let xi = argmax fi. Then, f1(x1)− f2(x2) ≤ f2(x1)− f2(x2) +  ≤ .
Lemma 8.
∑n
t=1 t
−1/2 ≤ 2n1/2, ∑nt=1 t−1/3 ≤ 32n2/3.
Proof. By bounding the summation of a decreasing function by an integral we have for r ∈ [0, 1],∑n
t=1 t
−r ≤ 1 + ∫ n
1
t−rdt ≤ 1 + n1−r1−r − 11−r ≤ n
1−r
1−r . Setting r = 1/2, 1/3 yields the results.
C Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we present a proof of the lower bound. We begin by reviewing some facts about
the KL divergence KL(·‖·). Recall that for two probabilities P,Q with Q absolutely continuous
with respect to P , the KL divergence is KL(P‖Q) = EP
[(
dP
dQ (X)
)]
. For distributions P, P ′, Q,Q′
with supp (P ) = supp (Q) and supp (P ′) = supp (Q′), the KL divergence between the product
distributions satisfies KL(P × P ′‖Q × Q′) = KL(P‖Q) + KL(P ′‖Q′). Additionally for two
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univariate Gaussians N (µ1, 1),N (µ2, 1), we know KL(N (µ1, 1)‖N (µ2, 1)) = (µ1 − µ2)2/2. The
following result from Tsybakov [43] will be useful in our proof.
Lemma 9 (Tsybakov [43], Lemmas 2.1 and 2.6). Let P,Q be probabilities such that Q is absolutely
continuous with respect to P . Let A be any event. Then,
P (A) +Q(Ac) ≥ 1
2
exp
(−KL(P‖Q)).
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let n > 1. Since the maximum is larger than an average, for any set of
real numbers{ai}i, we have max({ai}i) ≥
∑
i piiai for any {pii}i such that pii ≥ 0,
∑
i pii = 1.
Using Lemma 5 and the fact that RT is positive, we obtain the following two upper bounds on
max(nRT , R
a
T , R0T ):
max(nRT , R
a
T , R0T ) ≥
4
5
nRT +
1
5
R0T ≥ 2
5
nRT − 1
5
TWT ,
max(nRT , R
a
T , R0T ) ≥
4
5
nRT +
1
5
TRaT = nRT +
1
5
TWT ≥ 2
5
nRT +
1
5
TWT .
The LHS should be larger than both of the above lower bounds. Since max(a + b, a + c) =
a+ max(b, c), we have,
max(nRT , R
a
T , R0T ) ≥
2
5
nRT +
1
5
T |WT | ∆= QT .
We will obtain a lower bound on infA supΘ EQT which translates to a lower bound on the desired
quantity. Our strategy for doing so is to consider two problems in Θ and show that any algorithm
will not be able to distinguish between them. Both problems will have the same set of outcomes
Ω = {0, 1, . . . , . . . , |Ω| − 1} with Ω = S and |Ω| ≥ n+ 1. In the first problem, henceforth called θ0,
the optimal outcome is 0 with vi(0) = 1/2 for all agents i. For outcome j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vj(j) = 0
and vi(j) = 1/2 for every other agent i 6= j. For j > n, vi(j) < 1/4 for all i. When an outcome
ω is chosen, agent i realises a value drawn from N (vi(ω), 1). Finally, the seller has 0 value for all
outcomes, v0(j) = 0 for all j ∈ Ω. The following statements are true about problem θ0:
V (ω?) = V (0) =
n
2
, V 9i(ω9i? ) = V (i) =
n
2
− 1
2
,
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ω9i? ) =
n2
2
− n
2
.
The second problem, henceforth called θ1, is the same as θ0 but differs in outcomes j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
as follows:
vi(j) =
{
0 if i = j,
1
2 + δ if i 6= j.
Here, the value of δ ∈
(
0, 12(n−1)
)
will be specified shortly. The following statements are true about
problem θ1:
V (ω?) = V (0) =
n
2
, V 9i(ω9i? ) = V (i) =
n
2
− 1
2
+ (n− 1)δ,
n∑
i=1
V 9i(ω9i? ) =
n2
2
− n
2
+ n(n− 1)δ.
We will make the dependence of QT on the problem explicit and write QT (θ0), QT (θ1) respectively.
Consider any algorithm in A. Expectations and probabilities when we execute this algorithm
problem in θ0 will be denoted Eθ0 ,Pθ0 , and in problem θ1, they will be denoted Eθ1 ,Pθ1 . Let
Nt(ω) =
∑t−1
i=1 1(ωt = ω) denote the number of times outcome ω ∈ Ω was chosen in the first t− 1
time steps. With this notation, we can upper bound the welfare regret in problem θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} as,
Eθ[RT ] =
∑
j≥1
(V (0)− V (j))Eθ[Nt(j)] ≥
n∑
j=1
(V (0)− V (j))Eθ[Nt(j)].
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Using the observation that the gap between the optimal and any other outcome in problem θ0 is at
least 1/2, and that when HT > n2/2− n/2 + n(n− 1)δ/2, |WT | is at least n(n− 1)δ/2, we obtain
the following lower bound on Eθ0 [QT (θ0)]:
Eθ0 [QT (θ0)] ≥
2n
5
n∑
k=1
1
2
Eθ0 [Nt+1(k)] +
T
5
n(n− 1)δ
2
Pθ0
(
HT >
n2
2
− n
2
+
1
2
n(n− 1)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
)
,
≥ n
10
(
n∑
k=1
2Eθ0 [Nt+1(k)] + Tn(n− 1)δ Pθ0(A)
)
. (8)
By a similar argument regarding HT under the event Ac in problem θ1, we obtain the following.
Here, we have dropped the Eθ1 [Nt+1(k)] terms which are positive.
Eθ1 [QT (θ1)] ≥
n
10
Tn(n− 1)δ Pθ1(Ac).
To combine these results we will apply Lemma 9 on Pθ0(A)+P′θ0(A
c) in a manner similar to Bubeck
et al. [14]. Letting θt0, θ
t
1 denote the probability laws of the observed rewards up to time t in problems
θ0, θ1 respectively, we obtain
Pθ0(A) + P′θ0(A
c) ≥ 1
2
exp
(−KL(θt0‖θt1)) = 12 exp
− (n− 1)δ2
2
n∑
j=1
Eθ0 [Nt+1(j)]
 .
For the last step, observe that the outcomes 0, n+ 1, n+ 2, |Ω| − 1 have the same distributions under
both θ0 and θ1. For any outcome i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the distribution of agent i is also the same in both
problems. For all other agents j 6= i, the KL divergence between the corresponding distributions in
the two problems is δ2/2. By combining the three previous bounds, we obtain an upper bound on
Eθ0 [QT (θ0)] + Eθ1 [QT (θ1)]:
10
n
(
Eθ0 [QT (θ0)] + Eθ1 [QT (θ1)]
)
≥
n∑
k=1
2Eθ0 [Nt+1(k)] + T (n− 1)δ
(
Pθ0(A) + P′θ0(A
c)
)
,
≥ 2
n∑
k=1
Eθ0 [Nt+1(k)] +
1
2
T (n− 1)δ exp
(
− (n− 1)δ
2
2
n∑
k=1
Eθ0 [Nt+1(k)]
)
≥ min
x
{
2x +
1
2
T (n− 1)δ exp
(
− (n− 1)δ
2
2
x
)}
≥ 4
(n− 1)δ2 log
(
T (n− 1)2δ3
8
)
.
Finally, we choose δ =
(
16
T (n−1)2
)1/3
to obtain the bound:
1
2
(
Eθ0 [QT (θ0)] + Eθ1 [QT (θ1)]
)
≥ log(2)
5 · 162/3 · T
2/3(n− 1)4/3,
where δ < 12(n−1) is satisfied if T > 128n. The claim follows from supθ∈Θ E[QT (θ)] ≥
max (Eθ0 [QT (θ0)],Eθ1 [QT (θ1)]) ≥ 12Eθ0 [QT (θ0)] + 12Eθ1 [QT (θ1)].
D Some Useful Intermediate Results
In this section, we state and prove some intermediate technical lemmas that will be useful in the
proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. We begin with some notation and definitions. Recall that Algorithm 1
proceeds in a sequence of brackets. In our proofs, qt will denote the bracket index round t belongs to
and Tq will be the number of rounds completed by q brackets. Then,
Tqt−1 < t ≤ Tqt . (9)
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Eit, defined below, will denote the event that agent i’s values are trapped by the lower and upper
confidence bounds at round t when she participates truthfully. Et denotes the same for all agents.
Here v̂it,
̂
vit are as defined in (3). We have:
Eit =
(
∀ s ∈ S, vi(s) ∈ [
̂
vit(s), v̂it(s)]
)
, Et =
n⋂
i=1
Eit. (10)
For the allocation ωt at time t, let sit = si(ωt) be the outcome for agent i. Hence, for instance,
we can write V (ωt) = v0(ωt) +
∑n
i=1 vi(ωt) = v0(ωt) +
∑n
i=1 vi(sit). We will similarly use the
following definitions for the upper and lower bound on the welfare at time t, the functions F 9it , G
9i
t
used in the pricing calclulation, and their optimisers. Some of these terms have been defined before.
V̂t(ω) = v0(ω) +
n∑
i=1
v̂it(ωt), ωt = argmax
ω∈Ω
V̂t(ω),
̂
V t(ω) = v0(ω) +
n∑
i=1
̂
vit(ωt),
F 9it (ω) = v0(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
fit(ωt), ω
9i
t = argmax
ω∈Ω
F 9it (ω), (11)
G9it (ω) = v0(ω) +
∑
j 6=i
git(ωt), Gt(ω) = v0(ω) +
n∑
i=1
git(ωt).
For brevity, let v′it(s) denote the unclipped empirical mean in (3) and define βt, σit as below. With
this, we can rewrite the upper and lower confidence bounds (3) as follows:
βt =
√
5 log(t− qK + 1) + 2 log(|S|), σit(s) =
{
0 if i plays by bids
σ√
Nit(s)
otherwise , (12)
v̂it(s) = vit(s) + βtσit(s),
̂
vit(s) = vit(s)− βtσit(s).
The following fact, akin to Fact 4, is straightforward to verify.
Fact 10. In round t of Algorithm 1, the agent and seller utilities satisfy the following for the given
{fit, git}i,t choices.
if t ∈ E, uit = vi(sit), if t /∈ E, uit = vi(sit)− git(sit) +Gt(ωt)− F 9it (ω9it ),
if t ∈ E, u0t = v0(ωt), if t /∈ E, u0t =
n∑
i=1
F 9it (ω
9i
t )− (n− 1)Gt(ωt).
Our first result in this section bounds the number of brackets qT (9) after a given number of rounds T .
Lemma 11. Consider Algorithm 1 on the T th round, where T > 2K, and let qT denote the current
bracket index. If T is an exploration round, i.e. T ∈ E, then qT ≤ 3K−2/3T 2/3. If T /∈ E, then,
1
2K
−2/3T 2/3 ≤ qT ≤ 3K−2/3T 2/3.
Proof. For brevity, write q = qT , c = 5/6, d = 1/2. First let T /∈ E. Using the notation in (9), we
have
Tq−1 +K < T ≤ Tq, where, Tm = Km+
m∑
t=1
bcKtdc.
To bound Tm, letting Sm =
∑m
t=1 t
d and bounding the sum of an increasing function by an integral
we have, ∫ m
0
tddt < Sm <
∫ m+1
1
tddt =⇒ m
d+1
d+ 1
< Sm <
(m+ 1)d+1 − 1
d+ 1
. (13)
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This leads to the following bounds on T ,
T ≤ Tq ≤ qK +
q∑
t=1
cKtd ≤ qK + cK
d+ 1
(
(q + 1)d+1 − 1) (14)
≤ qd+1K + cK
d+ 1
(2q)d+1 ≤ c1q3/2K,
T ≥ Tq−1 +K ≥ qK +
q−1∑
t=1
(cKtd − 1) ≥ qK − (q − 1) + cK
d+ 1
(q − 1)d+1 (15)
≥ cK
d+ 1
(q
2
)d+1
= c2q
3/2K.
In (14), we have used the upper bound in (13) withm = q, and the facts q ≤ q3/2, q+1 ≤ 2q. In (15),
we have used the lower bound in (13) with m = q − 1, and the facts qK > q − 1, q − 1 ≥ q/2; the
last inequality holds when q ≥ 2 which is true when T ≥ 2K. Now, by substituting the values for c
and d, we have c1 = 1 + 10
√
2/9 and c2 = 5
√
2/36. Thus,
q ≤
(
T
c2K
)2/3
≤ 3 T
2/3
K2/3
, q ≥
(
T
c1K
)2/3
≥ 1
2
T 2/3
K2/3
.
This proves the result for T /∈ E. If T ∈ E, by noting that T ≥ Tq−1, we can repeat the calculations
in (15) to obtain the same bound.
Our next two results in this section control the probability that the upper and lower confidence bounds
do not trap the true values {vi(s)}i,s. Recall that sub-Gaussian random variables satisfy the following
concentration property. Let {Xi}ni=1 be n i.i.d samples from a σ sub-Gaussian distribution and
X = 1n
∑
iXi be its sample mean. Then,
P(X > ) ≤ e−n
2
2σ2 , P(X < ) ≤ e−n
2
2σ2 .
Lemma 12. Assume that agent i participates truthfully and let Eit be as defined in (10). When
ζ = ETC, for t /∈ E in period q, Pt(Ecit) ≤ 2(t−qK)−5/2. Moreover, for all T ,
∑T
t=1,t/∈E Pt(Ect ) ≤ 4.
When ζ = OPT, for t /∈ E in period q, Pt(Ecit) ≤ 2(t − qK)−3/2. Moreover, for all T ,∑T
t=1,t/∈E Pt(Ect ) ≤ 6.
Proof. If the agent participates by bids truthfully, then v̂it =
̂
vit = vi and the claim is trivially
true. For agents participating by rewards, we will first prove this for ζ = OPT. Consider the event
{vi(s) > v̂it(s)} and recall the definitions in (3). Let v′it(s) be the unclipped empirical mean in (3).
Let vit(s) = max(0, v′it(s)) and v̂it(s) = vit(s) + βtσit(s). Since vit(s) = min(1, vit(s)), we
have v̂it(s) ≥ v̂it(s). However, the following calculations show that P (vi(s) > v̂it(s)) = P(vi(s) >
v̂it(s)).
Pt (vi(s) > v̂it(s))
= Pt (vi(s) > v̂it(s)|v′it(s) ≥ 1)Pt(v′it(s) ≥ 1) + Pt (vi(s) > v̂it(s)|v′it(s) < 1)Pt(v′it(s) < 1)
= Pt
(
vi(s) > v̂it(s)|vit(s) ≥ 1
)
Pt(vit(s) ≥ 1) + Pt
(
vi(s) > v̂it(s)|vit(s) < 1
)
Pt(vit(s) < 1)
= Pt
(
vi(s) > v̂it(s)
)
.
Here, the second step uses two arguments. First, when v′it(s) < 1, then v̂it(s) = v̂it(s). Second,
when v′it(s) ≥ 1, then Pt(vi(s) > v̂it(s)) = Pt(vi(s) > v̂it(s)) = 1 since vi(s) ≤ 1 < v̂it(s) ≤
v̂it(s). We can now bound,
Pt(vi(s) > v̂it(s)) = Pt
(
vi(s) > max(0, v
′
it(s)) + βtσit(s)
)
≤ Pt
(
vi(s) >
1
Nit(s)
t−1∑
`=1
Xi`1(sit = s) + βt
σ√
Nit(s)
)
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≤ Pt
(
∃τ ∈ {q, . . . , t− (K − 1)q}, vi(s) > 1
τ
τ∑
`=1
X ′i` + βt
σ√
τ
)
≤
t−qK+q∑
τ=q
Pt
(
vi(s) >
1
τ
τ∑
`=1
X ′i` + βt
σ√
τ
)
≤ (t− qK + 1)e−β2t /2
≤ 1|S|(t− qK + 1)3/2
In the second step, if v′it(s) was clipped below at 0, then we can replace it with a smaller quantity. In
the third step, we have used the fact that Nit(s) would take a value in {q, . . . , t− (K − 1)q} since
there have been qK exploration rounds thus far, during which we have collected rewards from agent
i for outcome s exactly q times. {X ′i`}τ`=1 denotes the rewards Xi` collected when Nit(s) = τ . The
fourth step uses a union bound and the fourth step applies the sub-Gaussian condition. A similar
bound can be shown for the event {vi(s) <
̂
vit(s)}. The first claim follows by applying a union
bound over these two events and over all s ∈ S. The second claim follows from the observation∑∞
t=1 t
−3/2 ≤ 1 + ∫∞
1
t−3/2 ≤ 3.
Now consider ζ = ETC. The calculations above can be repeated, except Nit(s) = qt (9) deter-
ministically for all i, t. (When ζ = OPT, Nit(s) is random and depends on the reward realised.)
Therefore, we will not need the sum over τ ∈ {q, . . . , t − (K − 1)q}, resulting in the bound
e−β
2
t /2 ≤ 1|S|(t−qK)5/2 . The second claim follows from
∑
t t
−5/2 ≤ 2.
Lemma 13. Assume that all agents participate truthfully and let Et be as defined in (10). When
ζ = ETC, for t /∈ E in period q, Pt(Ect ) ≤ 2n(t− qK)−5/2. Moreover, for all T ,
∑T
t=1,t/∈E Pt(Ect ) ≤
4n. When ζ = OPT, for t /∈ E in period q, Pt(Ect ) ≤ 2n(t − qK)−3/2. Moreover, for all T ,∑T
t=1,t/∈E Pt(Ect ) ≤ 6n.
Proof. This follows by an application of the union bound over the agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n} on the
results of Lemma 12.
Next, we present a series of lemmas that will be useful in bounding the various regret quantities in
Theorems 2 and 3. The first result is a bound on the welfare regret.
Lemma 14. The welfare regret satisfies the following bound.
E[RT ] ≤ 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3 + 2βT
∑
t/∈E
n∑
i=1
Et[σit(sit)] + Vmax
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
Proof. Write RT =
∑T
t=1 rt where rt = V (ω?) − V (ωt). Recall that E denotes time indices
belonging to the explore phase. We split the instantaneous regret terms to obtain,
RT =
T∑
t=1,t∈E
rt +
T∑
t=1,t/∈E
rt.
First consider the second summation. Using the notation in (12), we obtain,
Et[rt] = Et[V (ω?)− V̂t(ωt) + V̂t(ωt)− V (ωt)] ≤ Et[V (ω?)− V̂t(ω?) + V̂t(ωt)− V (ωt)]
≤ Et[V (ω?)− V̂t(ω?) + V̂t(ωt)− V (ωt)|Ect ] + VmaxPt(Et) (16)
≤ Et[V̂t(ωt)−
̂
V t(ωt)|Ect ] + VmaxPt(Ect ) ≤ 2βt
n∑
i=1
Et[σit(sit)] + VmaxPt(Ect ).
Here, the second step uses the fact that V̂t is maximised at ωt. The fourth step uses that V̂t ≥ V and̂
V t ≤ V under Et. Now summing over all t, we obtain
E[RT ] ≤
∑
t∈E
Et[rt] +
∑
t/∈E
Et[rt] ≤
∑
t∈E
Vmax +
∑
t/∈E
(
2
n∑
i=1
βtEt[σit(sit)] + VmaxPt(Ect )
)
.
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Now, the number of terms in the first summation can be bound by qTK ≤ 3K1/3T 2/3 using Lemma 11.
The claim follows by observing βt ≤ βT for all t ≤ T .
The next lemma provides an upper bound on the agent regret. Recall that v†i = max(ui? −
mins vi(s), 0). If the agent prefers receiving any item in S for free instead of the socially opti-
mal outcome at the VCG price, then this term will be 0 and the agent does not incur any regret during
the exploration phase rounds.
Lemma 15. Consider any agent i and define at, bt as follows for t ≥ 0.
at = F
9i
t (ω
9i
t )−
̂
V t(ω
9i
? ), bt = git(sit)−
̂
vit(sit) + V̂t(ωt)−Gt(ωt).
Then, the following bound holds on the regret of agent i.
E[RiT ] ≤ 3v†iK1/3T 2/3 +
∑
t/∈E
Et[at] +
∑
t/∈E
Et[bt] +
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
Proof. As above, we will write RiT =
∑
t∈E rit +
∑
t/∈E rit, where rit = ui? − uit. We will first
bound the second summation in expectation. For t /∈ E, we use Facts 4 and 10 to obtain,
rit = git(sit)− vi(sit) + V (ω?)−Gt(ωt) + F 9it (ω9it )− V 9i(ω9i? ).
Under Et, the following are true; vi(sit) ≥
̂
vit(sit); V (ω?) ≤ V̂t(ω?) ≤ V̂t(ωt) since ωt maximises
V̂t. and V 9i(ω9i? ) ≥ V 9i(ω9it ) ≥
̂
V t(ω
9i
t ) since ω
9i
t maximises V
9i. This leads us to,
Et[rit] ≤ Et[F 9it (ω9it )−
̂
V t(ω
9i
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
at
|Et] + Et[git(sit)−
̂
vit(sit) + V̂t(ωt)−Gt(ωt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bt
|Et] + Pt(Ect ).
Summing over all t yields the following bound on the agent regret:
E[RiT ] ≤
∑
t∈E
v†i +
∑
t/∈E
Et[rit|Et] +
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ) (17)
≤ 3v†iK1/3T 2/3 +
∑
t/∈E
Et[at|Et] +
∑
t/∈E
Et[bt|Et] +
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
Here, for the first summation, we applied Lemma 11 to obtain v†i qTK ≤ 3v†iK1/3T 2/3. This
completes the proof.
When applying the above lemma, the different choices for f, g in Line 1 of Algorithm 1 will decide
the bounds for at, bt respectively. Additionally, note that at, bt are random variables measurable
with respect to the sigma field generated by observations up to time t− 1. Hence, Et[at],Et[bt] are
deterministic quantities. Our next lemma bounds the seller regret.
Lemma 16. Define A9it , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Bt as follows for t ≥ 0:
A9it = V
9i(ω9i? )− F 9it (ω9i? ), Bt = Gt(ωt)− V (ω?). (18)
Then, the following bound holds on the regret of the seller:
E[RiT ] ≤ 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3 +
∑
t/∈E
n∑
i=1
Et[A9it |Et] +
∑
t/∈E
Et[Bt|Et] + Vmax
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
Proof. As above, write R0T =
∑T
t∈E r0t +
∑T
t/∈E r0t, where r0t = u0? − u0t. To bound the second
summation, we use Facts 4 and 10 to obtain the following expression for r0t when t /∈ E:
r0t = u0? − u0t =
n∑
i=1
(
V 9i(ω9i? )− F 9it (ω9it )
)
+ (n− 1) (Gt(ωt)− V (ω?)) . (19)
Hence, Et[r0t] ≤
∑n
i=1 E[A9it |Et] + E[Bt|Et] + Pt(Ect ). The claim follows by observing that
maximum value for the seller is Vmax and that by Lemma 11 there are at most qTK ≤ K1/3T 2/3
exploration rounds in the first T rounds.
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Our final lemma in this section upper bounds E [max(nRT , RaT , R0T )].
Lemma 17. Let A9it , Bt be as defined in (18) and let RT , RaT , R0T be as defined in (2). Then,
E [max(nRT , RaT , R0T )]
≤ (n+ 1)RT + 2
n∑
i=1
∑
t/∈E
E[|A9it | |Et] + 2(n− 1)
∑
t/∈E
E[|Bt| |Et] + 2Vmax
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
Proof. Recall that RT is always non-negative while RaT and R0T may be positive or negative.
Moreover, from Lemma 5, we have RaT +R0T = RT . Since the maximum is smaller than the sum,
we have
max(nRT , R
a
T , R0T ) ≤ nRT + |RaT |+ |R0T | ≤ (n+ 1)RT + 2|R0T |. (20)
By the triangle inequality, we obtain the following bound on |R0T |, similar to Lemma 16:
E[|R0T |] ≤
∑
t∈E
E[|r0t|] +
∑
t/∈E
E[|r0t| |Et] +
∑
t/∈E
E[|r0t| |Et]
≤ 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3 +
n∑
i=1
∑
t/∈E
E[|A9it | |Et] + (n− 1)
∑
t/∈E
E[|Bt| |Et] + Vmax
∑
t/∈E
Pt(Ect ).
The claim follows by applying Lemma 11 for a bound on KqT .
E Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove the results for Algorithm 1, when ζ = ETC. We first state a complete version
of the theorem below.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in full). Let ζ = ETC. The following statements are true for Algorithm 1 after
T > 2K rounds for f, g choices as specified. Denote C1 = 4n, C2 = 4nVmax and C3 = 10σ. Let
κri = 1 if agent i participates by rewards and 0 if she participates by bids. Let v
†
i = max(ui? −
mins vi(s), 0).
1. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g) ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂}2, the welfare regret satisfies,
E[RT ] ≤ C2 +
(
3Vmax + C3n
√
log(|S|T )
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
2. If all agents are truthful, the regrets of agent i and the seller satisfy the following. If (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 +
(
3v†i + C3κ
r
i
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 +
(
3Vmax + 2C3n
2
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 +
(
3v†i + 2C3n
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v, v),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 +
(
3v†i + C3(n+ κ
r
i/2)
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 +
(
3Vmax + C3n
2
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3.
3. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g) ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂}2, we have
E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )] ≤ C2(n+ 3) +
(
3Vmax(n+ 3) + 5C3n
2
√
log(|S|T )
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
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4. Assume agent i participates truthfully, while other agents may not. When (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂)
or (f, g) = (v, v), uit ≥ 0 a.s. for all t for an agent participating by bids and, E[uit] ≥
−C3
√
log(|S|T )K1/3T 2/3 + 4 for all t for an agent participating by rewards. When (f, g) =
(v̂,
̂
v), then UiT ≥ −C3n
√
log(|S|T )K1/3T 2/3 a.s. for an agent participating by bids and
E[UiT ] ≥ −C3n
√
log(|S|T )K1/3T 2/3 + 4 for an agent participating by rewards.
5. Let T > 0 and pi be any (non-truthful) strategy for agent i and. Let UpiiT , UiT be the sum of
utilities when the agent follows pi and when being truthful respectively. If an agent participates
by bids, then regardless how others play, UpiiT − UiT ≤ 0 a.s. If participating by rewards, then
E[UpiiT − UiT ] ≤ C3n
√
log(|S|T )K1/3T 2/3.
In Section E.1, we bound the welfare regret. In Sections E.2, and E.3 we analyze the agent and
seller regrets respectively for the different choices for f and g. We combine them in Section E.4
to prove the second statement of the Theorem. Section E.5 upper bounds E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )].
Sections E.6 and E.7 establish individual rationality and truthfulness to prove the last two statements.
Recall that in the first three results, we assume that all agents are truthful, while in the last two, we
only assume that the relevant agent is truthful.
E.1 Bounding the Welfare Regret: Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. We will apply Lemma 14 to control the welfare regret. By Lemma 13, we have
∑
t Pt(Ect ) ≤
4n. We use the following argument to bound σit(sit). It uses Lemma 11 and the fact that at time t,
agent i will have experienced all outcomes s ∈ S at least qt times.
σit(sit) = σ/
√
Nit(sit) ≤ σ/√qt ≤
√
2K1/3t−1/3. (21)
Using Lemma 8 to bound
∑
t−1/3, we have
E[RT ] ≤ 4nVmax + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3 + 3
√
2βTnK
1/3T
2/3. (22)
The claim follows by substituting for βT (12). 
E.2 Bounding the Agent Regret
We will apply Lemma 15 and proceed to control the at, bt terms for the different f, g choices. First
consider at. When f =
̂
v, we have F 9it =
̂
V 9it and therefore E[at] = 0. When f = v̂, we have
F 9it = V̂
9i
t and therefore,
at = V̂
9i
t (ω
9i
t )−
̂
V 9it (ω
9i
t ) =
n∑
i=1
2βtσit(si(ω
9i
t )) ≤ 2
√
2βtnσK
1/3t
−1/3.
The last step uses an argument similar to (21) followed by Lemma 11. Similarly, when f = v, we
have at ≤ V 9it (ω9it )−
̂
V 9it (ω
9i
t ) ≤
√
2βTnσK
1/3t−1/3. Along with Lemma 8, we have the following
bounds on the sum of at’s:
∑
t/∈E
E[at|Et] ≤

0 if f =
̂
v,
3√
2
βTnσK
1/3T 2/3 if f = v,
3
√
2βTnσK
1/3T 2/3 if f = v̂.
(23)
Now consider bt and assume the agent participates by rewards. When g = v̂, git = v̂it andG9it = V̂
9i
t .
We therefore have, bt = v̂it(sit)−
̂
vit(sit) = 2βtσit(sit) ≤ 2
√
2σβtK
1/3t−1/3. When g =
̂
v, git =
̂
vit and G9it =
̂
V 9it , which results in bt = V̂t(ωt)−
̂
V t(ωt) = 2βt
∑
i σit(ωt) ≤ 2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t−1/3.
Similarly, when g = v, bt ≤
√
2βt(n+ 1)K
1/3t−1/3. The above results along with (17) will give us
bounds for the agent regret when she participates by rewards.
For an agent participating by bids
̂
vit = git = vi. The only change in the analysis is that now
bt = V̂t(ωt) − Gt(ωt) which can be bound in a similar fashion to above. Accounting for these
22
considerations, and using Lemma 8, we have the following bounds on the sum of bt’s:∑
t/∈E
E[bt|Et] ≤

3
√
2βTσnK
1/3T 2/3 if g =
̂
v,
3√
2
βTσ(n+ κ
r
i)K
1/3T 2/3 if g = v,
3
√
2βTσκ
r
iK
1/3T 2/3 if g = v̂.
(24)
Recall that κri = 1 if the agent participates by rewards and 0 if she participates by bids. We will use
these results to obtain bounds for the agent regret in Section E.4.
E.3 Bounding the Seller Regret
We will apply Lemma 16 and control the A9it , Bt terms for the different choices of f and g. First
consider the A9it terms. When f = v̂, then F
9i
t = V̂
9i
t is an upper bound for V
9i under Et. Hence,
A9it = maxV
9i −max V̂ 9it ≤ 0. When f =
̂
v, under Et, we obtain the following uniform bound on
V 9i(ω)− F 9it (ω):
∀ω ∈ Ω, V 9i(ω)− F 9it (ω) ≤ V̂ 9it (ω)−
̂
V 9it (ω) =
∑
j 6=i
2βtσjt(sj(ω))
≤ 2
√
2σβt(n− 1)K1/3t−1/3. (25)
Here, the last step uses an argument similar to (21). Hence, by Lemma 7, we have A9it = maxV
9i −
maxF 9it ≤ 2
√
2σβt(n − 1)K1/3t−1/3. When f = v, by a similar argument, we have A9it ≤√
2σβt(n− 1)K1/3t−1/3. Along with Lemma 8, we obtain the following.
n∑
i=1
∑
t/∈E
E[A9it |Et] ≤

3
√
2σβTn(n− 1)K1/3T 2/3 if f =
̂
v,
3√
2
σβTn(n− 1)K1/3T 2/3 if f = v,
0 if f = v̂.
(26)
Now, we turn to Bt. For this, note that under Et, V (ω?) ≥ V (ωt) ≥
̂
V t(ωt). When g =
̂
v, we have
Gt =
̂
V t and therefore Bt ≤ 0. When g = v̂, we have Gt = V̂t and therefore,
Bt ≤ V̂t(ωt)−
̂
V t(ωt) = 2βt
n∑
i=1
σit(sit) ≤ 2
√
2σnβtK
1/3t
−1/3.
A similar analysis shows Bt ≤
√
2σnβtK
1/3t−1/3 when g = v which yield the following bounds
for the sum of Bt’s.
(n− 1)
∑
t/∈E
E[Bt|Et] ≤

0 if g =
̂
v,
3√
2
σβTn(n− 1)K1/3T 2/3 if g = v,
3
√
2σβTn(n− 1)K1/3T 2/3 if g = v̂.
(27)
E.4 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. The claims simply follow by combining the bounds in (23), (24), and Lemma 15 for the agent
and the bounds in (26), (27), and Lemma 16 for the seller. When (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ 4nVmax +
(
3v†i + 3
√
2κriσβT
)
K
1/3T
2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 4nVmax +
(
3Vmax + 6
√
2σβTn(n− 1)
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
When (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ 4nVmax +
(
3v†i + 6
√
2σβTn
)
K
1/3T
2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 4n+ 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
Finally, when (f, g) = (v, v), we have the bounds below.
E[RiT ] ≤ 4n+
(
3v†i + 3
√
2σβT (n+ κ
r
i/2)
)
K
1/3T
2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 4n+
(
3Vmax + 3
√
2σβTn(n− 1)
)
K
1/3T
2/3.

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E.5 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof. We will use Lemma 17 to control the maximum of the three regret terms. We already have a
bound on RT from Section E.1, and bounds on A9it , Bt from Section E.3. The bounds for−A9it ,−Bt
are obtained by simply reversing the argument. First consider, |A9it |. If f = v̂, we already saw
A9it ≤ 0. By using an argument similar to (25), we obtain −A9it ≤ 2
√
2σβt(n − 1)K1/3t−1/3.
Similarly, if f =
̂
v, we already saw A9it ≤ 2
√
2σβt(n− 1)K1/3t−1/3. Moreover,
−A9it =
̂
V 9it (ω
9i
t )− V 9i(ω?) ≤ V 9i(ω9it )− V 9i(ω?) ≤ 0.
Finally, when f = v, both A9it and −A9it can be bounded by
√
2σβt(n− 1)K1/3t−1/3. Therefore, for
all f values we have |A9it | ≤ 2
√
2σβt(n− 1)K1/3t−1/3. After an application of Lemma 8, we obtain,∑
i
∑
t/∈E
E[|A9it | |Et] ≤ 3
√
2σβtn(n− 1)K1/3T 2/3. (28)
By following a similar argument, we can obtain (n − 1)∑t/∈E E[|Bt| |Et] ≤ 3√2σβtn(n −
1)K1/3T 2/3. The claim follows by combining the above with Lemma 17, the bound on the wel-
fare regret in (22), and Lemma 13 to control
∑
t/∈E Pt(Ect ). 
E.6 Individual Rationality: Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof. For all agents, uit ≥ 0 when t ∈ E, so let us consider t /∈ E, where, by Fact 10,
uit = vi(sit)− git(sit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct
+Gt(ωt)− F 9it (ω9it )︸ ︷︷ ︸
dt
. (29)
We will first bound ct. If agent i participates by bids truthfully, git = vi and hence ct = 0. To bound
ct when she participates by rewards truthfully, let c˜t = max(0, git(sit) − vi(sit)) ≥ 0. Clearly,
ct ≥ −c˜t. Observing that vi ≤ v̂it under Eit (10), we have,
E[c˜t|Eit] ≤ 0 if g =
̂
v, E[c˜t|Eit] ≤ βtσit(sit) if g = v. E[c˜t|Eit] ≤ 2βtσit(sit) if g = v̂.
To bound dt, observe that when ζ = ETC,
̂
vit, vit, v̂it are vertically shifted functions; for agents
participating by bids, they are identical while for agents participating by rewards, we use only
one observation per allocation per agent in each exploration phase. Therefore,
̂
V t, V t, V̂t are also
vertically shifted functions and hence ωt = argmax V̂t = argmax
̂
V t = argmaxV t. First consider
the case (f, g) = (v, v). Since, V t = V 9it + vit and vit ≥ 0 (recall from (3) that we clip vit between
0 and 1), we have that V t ≥ V 9it . Therefore, dt = maxV t −maxV 9it ≥ 0. By a similar argument,
when (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂), dt = max V̂t −max
̂
V 9it ≥ max V̂t −max V̂ 9it ≥ 0. When (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v),
one no longer has dt ≥ 0 since V̂ 9it can be larger than
̂
V t. However, we can obtain a weaker bound
of the form,
dt =
̂
V t(ωt)− V̂ 9it (ω9it ) = max V̂t −max V̂ 9it − 2
∑
i
σit(sit) ≥ −2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t
−1/3.
We can now bound the utilities for the various f, g values as given in the theorem. We will first
consider the cases (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂) and (f, g) = (v, v) when the agent is participating by bids. We
have, uit = ct + dt ≥ 0 a.s. for all t /∈ E. That is, the algorithm is instantaneously individually
rational. If (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v) then, UiT =
∑
t uit ≥ −3
√
2nσβtK
1/3T 2/3 a.s..
If agent i participates by rewards truthfully, by the previous three displays, we have,
E[uit] ≥

−3√2σβtK1/3T 2/3 + 4, if (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂),
− 3√
2
σβtK
1/3T 2/3 + 4, if (f, g) = (v, v),
−3√2nσβtK1/3T 2/3 + 4, if (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v).

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E.7 Truthfulness: Proof of Theorem 2.5
Our main tool in the proof of truthfulness will be Lemma 6. There, we will set pi2 to be the
(non-truthful) policy pi in the theorem statement and pi1 to be a truthful policy played either via
bids or rewards. pirt is the policy which submits bids or rewards according to pi for time steps
1, . . . , r − 1. Therefore, the allocations for rounds 1, . . . , r will be based on these pi submissions.
After experiencing the allocation for the rth round, it will switch to a truthful policy, and the allocations
for rounds r+ 1 onwards are based on these truthful submissions. If participating by bids, this means
it will change the bid function, and if participating by rewards, it means it will replace the reported
rewards Yit from previous steps with the true rewards Xit and continue playing truthfully from round
r + 1 onwards.
Proof. By substituting the appropriate terms in Lemma 6, we have
UpiiT − UiT =
T∑
t=1
upiit − ut−1it +
T∑
t=2
ut−1it − uit, (30)
where upiit, u
r
it, uit are respectively the utilities of agent i when following policies pi, pi
r
t and truthful
reporting. We will also denote the outcomes at time t as ωpit , ω
r
t , ωt and the allocations for agent i at
time t as spiit, s
r
it, sit for these policies respectively. As mentioned in Remark 1, we will first fix any
randomness and simply look at the change in utility for agent i when switching from pi to truthful
reporting.
First, consider the second summation, where we claim that each term inside the summation is 0. To
see this, note that pit−1t is also participating truthfully at round t. It has replaced its reported rewards
with its true realised rewards in the previous rounds. The mechanism only uses rewards reported
in the exploration rounds to decide allocations on the exploitation rounds, and the allocations in
the exploration rounds are chosen independent of the bids/rewarks reported by the agent. As the
allocation and prices in round t will be the same for both policies, ut−1it = uit.
Now turn to the first summation in the RHS of (30). In the remainder of the proof, git will denote the
appropriate quantity, either
̂
vit, vit, or v̂it depending on the value of hyperparameter g, for agent i
when following pit−1t . Since, at time t, she has switched to being truthful, this is computed using her
actual rewards. Similarly, let Gt denote either
̂
V t, V t, or V̂t for the welfare when agent i follows
pit−1t . Using these, we can write for t /∈ E,
upiit − ut−1it =
(
vi(s
pi
it) +
(
v0(ω
pi
t ) +
∑
j 6=i
gjt(ω
pi
t )
)
−max
ω
F 9it (ω)
)
(31)
−
(
vi(s
t−1
it ) +
(
v0(ω
t−1
t ) +
∑
j 6=i
gjt(ω
t−1
t )
)
−max
ω
F 9it (ω)
)
,
= vi(s
pi
it)− vi(st−1it ) +
(
v0(ω
pi
t ) +
∑
j 6=i
gjt(ω
pi
t )
)
−
(
v0(ω
t−1
t ) +
∑
j 6=i
gjt(ω
t−1
t )
)
,
= (vi(s
pi
it)− git(spiit)) + (git(st−1it )− vi(st−1it )) +(
v0(ω
pi
t ) +
n∑
i=1
gjt(ω
pi
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gt(ωpit )
)
−
(
v0(ω
t−1
t ) +
n∑
i=1
gjt(ω
t−1
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gt(ω
t−1
t )
)
,
≤ (vi(spiit)− git(spiit)) + (git(st−1it )− vi(st−1it )).
Here, the first step substitutes expressions for upiit, u
t−1
it from Fact 4. The maxω F
9i
t (ω) terms
are cancelled out in the second step; they will be the same for both policies pi, pit−1t since it is
computed using the rewards reported by other agents in rounds 1, . . . , t − 1 and hence does not
depend on the fact that agent i has switched policies in the current round. The third step adds and
subtracts git(spiit) + git(s
t−1
it ) and observes that the last two terms are Gt(ω
pi
t ), Gt(ω
t−1
t ), where,
recall Gt is the appropriate quantity computed after agent i switches to truthful reporting. To obtain
the last step, recall that ωt−1t = argmaxω V̂t(ω) by line 7 of Algorithm 1. As we observed in
Section E.6, ωt−1t = argmaxω Gt(ω) since
̂
V t, V t, V̂t are vertically shifted functions and therefore,
25
Gt(ω
t−1
t ) ≥ Gt(ωpit ). We emphasise that the above calculations do not use the fact that v̂jt is an
upper confidence bound on vj for an agent j 6= i; this may not be true since agent j may not be
truthful. Instead, it is simply treated as a function of rewards reported by agent j in previous rounds.
To complete the proof, we can use the fact that that the git terms are computed under truthful
reporting from agent i. If the agent participates by bids, then git = vi and hence upiit − ut−1it ≤ 0 a.s..
Combining this with the fact that the utilities for all policies are the same during t ∈ E, we have
UpiiT − UiT ≤ 0 a.s.. For an agent participating by rewards, under Eit,
vi(s
pi
it)− git(spiit) + git(st−1it )− vi(st−1it ) = vi(spiit)− v̂it(spiit) + v̂it(st−1it )− vi(st−1it )
≤ 2βtσit(si(ω9it )) ≤ 2
√
2βtσK
1/3t
−1/3.
Here, we have used the fact the widths of the confidence intervals are all equal. This leads us to
E[upiit − ut−1it |Eit] ≤ 2
√
2βtσK
1/3t−1/3 and consequently,
E[UpiiT − UiT ] =
∑
t
E[upiit − ut−1it |Eit] +
∑
t
P(Eit) ≤ 3
√
2βTnK
1/3T
2/3 + 4.

F Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we analyse Algorithm 1 when ζ = OPT. We first state a complete version of the
theorem below.
Theorem (Theorem 3 in full). Let ζ = OPT. The following are true for Algorithm 1 after T > 2K
rounds. Denote C1 = 6n, C2 = 6nVmax, C3 = 10σ, and C4 = 9σ. Let κri = 1 if agent i participates
by rewards and 0 if she participates by bids.
1. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g), the welfare regret satisfies,
E[RT ] ≤ C2 + C4n
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
2. If all agents are truthful, the regrets of agent i and the seller, satisfy the following. If (f, g) =
(
̂
v, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 + C4κri
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + 3v†iK1/3T 2/3.
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 + C4n2
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + (3Vmax + 2C3n2√log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (
̂
v,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 + C4n
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + 3v†iK1/3T 2/3.
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 +
(
3Vmax + 2C3n
2
√
log(|S|T ))K1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v̂, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 + C4κri
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + (3v†i + C3n)K1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 + C4n2
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
If (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ C1 + C4n
√
|S|T log(|S|T ) + (3v†i + C3n)K1/3T 2/3
E[R0T ] ≤ C2 + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
3. Assume all agents are truthful. For all (f, g) ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂}2, we have
E[max(nRT , RaT , R0T )]
≤ C2(n+ 3) + 3C4n2
√
log(|S|T )+
(
3Vmax(n+ 3) + 4C3n
2
√
log(|S|T )
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
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4. For an agent i participating by bids truthfully (while others may not be), when g = v̂, uit ≥ 0
a.s. for all t, and when g =
̂
v, UiT ≥ −C4n
√|S|T log(|S|T ) a.s.. For an agent participating
by rewards truthfully, when g = v̂, E[UiT ] ≥ −6 − C4
√|S|T log(|S|T ), and when g = ̂v,
E[UiT ] ≥ −6− C4n
√|S|T log(|S|T ).
5. Let UpiiT , UiT be as defined in Theorem 2. Assume that other agents adopt stationary policies.
Then, for any (stationary or non-stationary) policy pi,
E[UpiiT − UiT ] ≤ 2C1 + C3(6n+ 2κri)
√
log(|S|T )K1/3T 2/3.
F.1 Bounding the Welfare Regret: Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We use Lemma 14 to bound the welfare regret. By Lemma 13, we have
∑
t Pt(Ect ) ≤ 6n. The
following argument will help us bound
∑
t/∈E σit(sit) for each agent i:∑
t/∈E
1√
Nit(sit)
≤
∑
t>K
1√
Nit(sit)
≤
∑
s∈S
NiT (s)∑
j=1
1√
j
(32)
≤ 2
∑
s∈S
√
NiT (s) ≤ 2
√
|S|(T − qK) ≤ 2
√
|S|T .
The first step simply adds more terms to the summation. The second step observes that the summation
can be written as |S| different summations, one for each s ∈ S . The third step uses Lemma 8. These
results along with Lemma 13 yield:
E[RT ] ≤ 6Vmaxn+ 4σnβT |S|1/2T 1/2 + 3K1/3T 2/3. (33)
The claim follows by substituting for βT . 
F.2 Bounding the Agent Regret
We will use Lemma 15 and bound the at, bt terms for the different choices of hyperparameters f, g.
First, at is bounded identically to obtain the upper bound in (23); this uses the fact that even when
ζ = OPT, there will have been qT exploration phases by round T . However, we will obtain tighter
bounds for bt.
When g = v̂, git = v̂it and G9it = V̂
9i
t . We therefore have, bt = v̂it(sit)−
̂
vit(sit) = 2βtσit(sit) if
the agent is participating by rewards and bt = 0 if she is participating by bids. Similarly, when g =
̂
v,
bt = V̂t(ωt) −
̂
V t(ωt) = 2βt
∑
i σit(ωt), and when g = v, bt = vit(sit) −
̂
vit(sit) + V̂t(ωt) −
V t(ωt) = βtσit(sit) + βt
∑
i σit(ωt). Using a similar argument to (32), we obtain the following
bounds on the sum of bt’s when t /∈ E:
∑
t/∈E
E[bt|Et] ≤

4βTσn|S|1/2T 1/2 if g =
̂
v,
2βTσ(n+ κ
r
i)|S|1/2T 1/2 if g = v,
4κriβTσ|S|1/2T 1/2 if g = v̂.
(34)
Recall that κri = 1 if the agent is participating by rewards, and κ
r
i = 0 if she is participating by
bids. We will combine this result with (17) and (23) to bound the agent regret for different f, g
hyperparameter choices in Appendix F.4.
F.3 Bounding the Seller Regret
Following along the same lines as Appendix E.3, we will use Lemma 16 to control the seller regret,
and moreover, use the expression in (26) to bound the E[A9it |Et] terms. The same bounding technique
can be used since, even when ζ = OPT, there will have been qT exploration phases by round T .
To bound the Bt terms, we first observe that under Et, V (ω?) ≥ V (ωt) ≥
̂
V t(ωt). When g =
̂
v,
we have Gt =
̂
V t, and therefore Bt ≤ 0. When g = v̂, we have Gt = V̂t, and therefore Bt ≤
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V̂t(ωt) −
̂
V t(ωt) = 2βt
∑
i σit(sit). And when g = v, Bt ≤ βt
∑
i σit(sit). Putting these results
together and using a similar argument to (32), we obtain the following bounds on the sum of Bt’s:
(n− 1)
∑
t/∈E
E[Bt|Et] ≤

0 if g =
̂
v,
2σβTn(n− 1)|S|1/2T 1/2 if g = v,
4σβTn(n− 1)|S|1/2T 1/2 if g = v̂.
(35)
F.4 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The claims follow by combining the bounds in (23), (34), and Lemma 15 for the agent and the
bounds in (26), (35), and Lemma 16 for the seller. When (f, g) = (
̂
v, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ 6n+ 4σβTκri|S|1/2T 1/2 + 3v†iK1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 6nVmax + 4σβTn(n− 1)|S|1/2T 1/2 +
(
3Vmax + 3
√
2σβTn(n− 1)
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
When (f, g) = (
̂
v,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ 6n+ 4σβTn|S|1/2T 1/2 + 3v†iK1/3T 2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 6nVmax +
(
3Vmax + 3
√
2σβTn(n− 1)
)
K
1/3T
2/3.
When (f, g) = (v̂, v̂),
E[RiT ] ≤ 6n+ 4σβTκri|S|1/2T 1/2 + (3v†i + 3
√
2σβTn)K
1/3T
2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 6nVmax + 4σβTn(n− 1)|S|1/2T 1/2 + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.
When (f, g) = (v̂,
̂
v),
E[RiT ] ≤ 6n+ 4σβTn|S|1/2T 1/2 + (3v†i + 3
√
2σβTn)K
1/3T
2/3,
E[R0T ] ≤ 6nVmax + 3VmaxK1/3T 2/3.

F.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. We will use Lemma 17 to bound the maximum of the three regret quantities. Since there
will have been qT exploration phases in T rounds, we use the expression in (28) to bound the
sum of E[|A9it ||Et] terms. Next, let us turn to the |Bt| terms in the RHS of Lemma 17. When
g =
̂
v, we already saw in Section F.3 that Bt ≤ 0. Moreover, −Bt = V (ω?) −
̂
V t(ωt) ≤
V̂t(ωt)−
̂
V t(ωt) ≤ 2βt
∑
i σit(sit). Similarly, when g = v̂, we already saw Bt ≤ 2βt
∑
i σit(sit).
Moreover, −Bt = V (ω?) − V̂t(ωt) ≤ 0. Finally, when g = v, both Bt,−Bt can be bounded by
βt
∑
i σit(sit). In all cases, we have |Bt| ≤ 2βt
∑
i σit(sit) and therefore, by following the same
calculations in (32), we have,
(n− 1)
∑
t/∈E
E[|Bt| |Et] ≤ 4σβTn(n− 1)|S|1/2T 1/2.
The claim follows by combining the above with Lemma 17, the bound on the welfare regret in (33),
and Lemma 13 to control
∑
t/∈E Pt(Ect ). 
F.6 Individual Rationality: Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. For all agents, uit ≥ 0 when t ∈ E, so let us consider t /∈ E. As in Section E.6, we write
uit = ct + dt where ct, dt are as defined in (29). First consider ct. If agent i participates by bids
truthfully, git = vi and hence ct = 0. To bound ct when she participates by rewards truthfully, let
c˜t = max(0, git(sit)− vi(sit)) ≥ 0. Clearly, ct ≥ −c˜t. Observing that vi ≤ v̂it under Eit (10), we
have,
E[c˜t|Eit] ≤ 0 if g =
̂
v, E[c˜t|Eit] ≤ 2βtσit(sit) if g = v̂.
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To bound dt, first note that V̂t(ωt) −max V̂ 9it ≥ 0 since V̂t = V̂ 9it + v̂it and v̂it ≥ 0. Therefore,
when g = v̂,
dt = V̂t(ωt)− F 9it (ω9it ) ≥ V̂t(ωt)−max V̂ 9it ≥ 0,
and when g =
̂
v,
dt =
̂
V t(ωt)− F 9it (ω9it ) ≥ V̂t(ωt)−max V̂ 9it − 2βt
∑
j
σjt(sjt) ≥ −2βt
∑
j
σjt(sjt).
Moreover, by following the same calculations as in (32), we have
∑
t βtσjt(sjt) ≤ 2βT |S|1/2T 1/2
for all agents j. Therefore, for an agent participating by bids, UiT ≥ −4βTn|S|1/2T 1/2 if g =
̂
v, and
UiT ≥ 0 if g = v̂. For an agent participating by rewards,
E[UiT ] ≥ −
∑
t/∈E
E[c˜t|Eit]−
∑
t/∈E
P(Ecit) +
∑
t/∈E
E[dt] ≥
{−4βTn|S|1/2T 1/2 − 6 if g = ̂v,
−4βT |S|1/2T 1/2 − 6 if g = v̂.
We emphasise that we have only assumed truthfulness from agent i, specifically in bounding ct. To
bound dt, we have simply used a relation between V̂t and
̂
V t which holds almost surely regardless of
the rewards reported by other agents. 
F.7 Truthfulness: Proof of Theorem 3.5
Proof. As we did for ζ = ETC, we will use Lemma 6 and set pi1, pi2, pirt as described in the beginning
of Section E.7. This leads us to the expression in (30) for UpiiT − UiT . The main difference is that
now the mechanism uses all of the rewards reported by the agents, and this needs to be accounted for
when bounding the two summations. In this proof, we will annotate quantities related to policy pit−1t
at time t with a prime. For example, v̂′it : S → R (see (3)) will be the upper confidence bounds at
time t for agent i when following pit−1t . On the same note, E ′it denotes the event that agent i’s true
values fall within the confidence interval at time t when she follows pit−1t .
For the terms in the first summation in (30), by repeating the calculations in (31), we obtain (using
our above notation),
upiit − ut−1it = (vi(spiit)− g′it(spiit)) + (g′it(st−1it )− vi(st−1it )) +G′t(ωpit )−G′t(ωt−1t ).
Recall that (g′it, G
′
t) denote either (
̂
v
′
it,
̂
V t), (v′it, V
′
t) or (v̂
′
it, V̂
′
t ) as per the value of g being
̂
v, v, or
v̂. They are computed under truthful reporting from agent i. If the agent participates by bids, then
g′it = vi and hence vi(s)− g′it(s) = 0 for all s. If she participates by rewards, then for all choices of
g ∈ {
̂
v, v, v̂},
E[(vi(spiit)− g′it(spiit)) + (g′it(st−1it )− vi(st−1it )|E ′it] ≤ 2
√
2σβtK
1/3t
−1/3. (36)
This follows from the observation that when g = v̂, the first term is less than 0 while the second
is less than 2βtσit(st−1it ) ≤ 2
√
2σβtK
1/3t−1/3 by Lemma 11 and the fact that there have been qt
exploration phases; a similar argument holds for g =
̂
v, but with the terms reversed; when g = v, both
terms are less than
√
2σβtK
1/3t−1/3. Next, we use ωt−1t = argmaxω V̂
′
t (ω) to bound the difference
G′t(ω
pi
t )−G′t(ωt−1t ). When g = v̂,
G′t(ω
pi
t )−G′t(ωt−1t ) = V̂ ′t (ωpit )− V̂ ′t (ωt−1t ) ≤ 0.
When g =
̂
v, we can use the fact that at round t /∈ E all allocations will have been experienced by
each agent at least qt times (9) to obtain,
G′t(ω
pi
t )−G′t(ωt−1t ) =
̂
V t(ω
pi
t )−
̂
V t(ω
t−1
t )
≤ V̂ ′t (ωpit )− V̂ ′t (ωt−1t ) + 2βt
∑
i
(σ′it(s
t−1
it )− σ′it(ωpit ))
≤ 2βt
∑
i
σ′it(ω
t−1
t ) ≤ 2σβt
∑
i
1√
qt
≤ 2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t
−1/3.
29
The last step uses Lemma 11. By a similar argument, we get G′t(ω
pi
t ) − G′t(ωt−1t ) ≤√
2σβtnK
1/3t−1/3 when g = v. Now summing over all t and using Lemma 8, we obtain
∑
t/∈E
E[upiit − ut−1it |E ′it] ≤

3
√
2σ(n+ κri)βTK
1/3T 2/3 if g =
̂
v,
3
√
2σ(n/2 + κri)βTK
1/3T 2/3 if g = v,
3
√
2σκriβTK
1/3T 2/3 if g = v̂.
(37)
We now move to the second summation in (30). To bound this term, we will use the fact that all agents
except i are adopting stationary policies. Therefore the rewards reported by any agent j 6= i for any
s ∈ S concentrates around some mean, and we can apply Lemma 12 for that agent. For the remainder
of this proof, vj(s) will denote the mean of this distribution. This may not be equal to the true value
of agent j for outcome s since she may not be truthful. Et, E ′t denote the events that vj(s) falls within
the confidence intervals (
̂
vjt(s), v̂jt(s)), (
̂
v
′
jt(s), v̂
′
jt(s)) respectively for all agents j. Here, recall,
the former interval is obtained for agent j when agent i is being truthful from the beginning and the
latter when i is following pit−1t . We now expand each term in the second summation as follows,
ut−1it − uit =
(
vi(s
t−1
it ) +
(
v0(ω
t−1
t ) +
∑
j 6=i
g′jt(ω
t−1
t )
)
−max
ω
F ′9it (ω)
)
(38)
−
(
vi(sit) +
(
v0(ωt) +
∑
j 6=i
gjt(ωt)
)
−max
ω
F 9it (ω)
)
,
=
(
vi(s
t−1
it )− g′it(st−1it )
)
+
(
git(sit)− vi(sit)
)
+
(
G′t(ω
t−1
t )−Gt(ωt)
)
+
(
max
ω
F 9it (ω)−max
ω
F ′9it (ω)
))
.
The first step uses the expressions in Fact 10, while the second step adds and subtracts
g′it(s
t−1
it ) + git(sit) and rearranges the terms. To bound all four terms in (38), we will use that
git, g
′
it, Gt, G
′
t, F
9i
t , F
′9i
t are all computed under truthful reporting from agent i, that all other agents
are adopting stationary policies, and that each agent has experienced each outcome at least qt times (9)
in round t. The first two terms are 0 for an agent participating by bids. If participating by rewards,
via a similar reasoning to that used in (36),
E[(vi(st−1it )− g′it(st−1it )) + (git(sit)− vi(sit))|E ′it, Eit] ≤ 2
√
2σβtK
1/3t
−1/3.
To bound the third term in (38), observe that V̂ ′t − V̂t is uniformly bounded under Et ∩ E ′t.
V̂ ′t (ω)− V̂t(ω) =
∑
i
(v̂′it(ω)− v̂it(ω)) =
∑
i
(v̂′it(ω)− vi(ω)) +
∑
i
(vi(ω)− v̂it(ω))
≤ 2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t
−1/3.
Observing that ωt−1t = argmaxω V̂
′
t (ωt) and ωt = argmaxω V̂t(ωt), we use Lemma 7 to obtain,
G′t(ω
t−1
t )−Gt(ωt) = V̂ ′t (ωt−1t )− V̂t(ωt) + βtκg
∑
j
(σjt(ωt)− σ′jt(ωt−1t ))
≤ (2 + κg)
√
2σβtnK
1/3t
−1/3.
Here κg = 0 if g =
̂
v, κg = 1 if g = v, and κg = 2 if g =
̂
v. Above, the first step rewrites the
expression for Gt, G′t in terms of V̂t, V̂
′
t , and κg. The second step drops the σ
′
it(ω
t−1
t ) terms and
bounds the σit(ωt−1t ) terms using Lemma 11. To bound the last term, we observe that F
′9i
t − F 9it is
uniformly bounded under Et ∩ E ′t. Using a similar reasoning to (36),
F ′t (ω)− Ft(ω) =
∑
i
(f ′it(ω)− fit(ω)) =
∑
i
(f ′it(ω)− vi(ω)) +
∑
i
(vi(ω)− fit(ω))
≤ 2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t
−1/3.
By Lemma 7, we therefore have, maxω F 9it (ω)−maxω F ′9it (ω) ≤ 2
√
2σβtnK
1/3t−1/3. Summing
over all t and using Lemma 8, we can now bound the second summation in (30).∑
t/∈E
E[ut−1it − uit|E ′t, Et] ≤ 3
√
2σ
(
κri + n(4 + κg/2)
)
βTK
1/3T
2/3. (39)
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Figure 1: Results for a single-parameter single-environment simulation. We show the welfare regret,
the seller regret, and the regret of four agents. Lower is better in all cases. Agent 1 is the optimal
agent, in that, if the values were known, the item would go to agent 1 always. The figures were
obtained by averaging over five independent runs and the shaded regions represent two standard
errors. The jagged shape of the curves is due to the periodic exploration phase in the algorithm.
Finally, we can combine the results in (37), (39) to obtain
E[UpiiT − UiT ] =
∑
t/∈E
E[upiit − uit] =
∑
t/∈E
E[upiit − uit|Et, E ′t] +
∑
t/∈E
P(Ect ∪ E ′ct )
=
∑
t/∈E
E[upiit − ut−1it |E ′it] +
∑
t/∈E
E[ut−1it − uit|Et, E ′t] + 12n
≤ 3
√
2σ
(
2κri + n(4 + κg)
)
βTK
1/3T
2/3 + 12n.
The first step observes that the allocations and prices are the same during the exploration phase rounds
E. The third step uses Lemma 13, although it should be noted that E ′t now refers to an event at each
time step when the policy changes at each step. The claim follows by noting that κg ≤ 2. 
G A Simulation
We present some simulation results in a single-parameter single-item environment. Here, ten agents
are competing for a single item. When an agent receives the item, her value is drawn stochastically
from aN (µ, 0.5) distribution where µ is chosen uniformly on a grid in the interval (0.2, 0.8). Agent 1
has an expected valuation of 0.8 (and will be the agent who receives the item if values are known) and
agent 10 has a valuation of 0.2. If an agent does not receive the item, their value is non-stochastically
zero. Observe that this is environment is rather noisy—the variance of the reward distribution is
large when compared to the variation in the mean rewards. Moreover, even the winning agent might
receive negative stochastic reward with non-trivial probability, which is worse than not receiving the
item. The game is repeated for 2000 rounds.
We have shown the pseudo-regrets for the welfare, the seller, and a few agents in Figure 1. We have
used f = v in all of them. g is not a relevant hyperparameter in this setting, since the valuation
without the winning agent is always 0. As we see, ζ = OPT performs better on all plots. ETC has
high variance and it struggles to differentiate between the best and the sub-optimal agents. This, we
believe, is because it discards most of the data collected. For example, Agent 2 incurs large regret
with ζ = ETC. The regrets of agents 2 to 10 decrease since their utility at the socially optimal outcome
is zero, but they occasionally get the item assigned to them during the exploration phase.
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